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Title: The Drone and The Dove: Fighting Al-Qa’ida While Negotiating Peace in Yemen 
 International conflicts are becoming more complex. Many involve multiple intra-
state parties with multiple and at times opposing interests. With increasing globalization 
and the resulting growth in connectivity, the United States and other Western nations will 
likely find themselves increasingly involved in these conflicts.1 Recent history has shown 
that the ‘military option’ is not as effective as previously thought in dealing with inter-
state conflicts. Thus, studies that explore other options in the management and resolution 
of these conflicts are critical. This thesis will explore and analyze the option of a systems 
theory based model as a model for conflict resolution by specifically analyzing the use of 
such a model in the present conflict in Yemen.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
PROLOGUE 
 
The morning of September 17, 2008 began like any other for the staff at the U.S. 
Embassy in Sana’a, the capital city of Yemen. Early in the morning, at 4:40 AM the 
morning call to prayer went off at what Islamic scholars call “true dawn”, when the first 
faint glimmer of the sun’s light starts to spread horizontally across the sky.2 From the 
post outside the embassy, the local guards couldn’t see much because of the light 
pollution in the city, but they heard the chants of “Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar”3 
signaling the beginning of the day.4 Since it was Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for 
all Muslims, there would be no more food or water until sunset. A few blocks away, two 
Suzuki jeeps with darkly tinted windows were driving towards the embassy, these jeeps 
held a total of seven men all dressed in military uniforms.5 
These men were quite knowledgeable about early Islamic history and had picked 
the date for their mission on purpose. In 624 A.D., in the very early days of Islam, on 
September 17th, the Prophet Muhammad had led a small band of believers to victory 
against a much larger pagan force, a victory that Muhammad and the Qur’an attributed to 
divine intervention.6 The seven men driving towards the U.S. Embassy saw themselves as 
true believers of Islam, going to crush the infidels just like the faithful had done centuries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Johnsen,	  Gregory	  D.	  "The	  Benghazi	  That	  Wasn’t:	  How	  One	  Man	  Saved	  The	  American	  Embassy	  In	  Yemen."	  BuzzFeed	  News.	  BuzzFeed,	  Inc.,	  23	  May	  2014.	  Web.	  5	  July	  2015.	  <http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/the-­‐benghazi-­‐that-­‐wasnt-­‐how-­‐one-­‐man-­‐saved-­‐the-­‐american-­‐embas#.xaOPoNBg1>.	  3	  Arabic	  for	  an	  Islamic	  phrase	  that	  translates	  into	  “God	  is	  the	  Greatest”,	  also	  known	  as	  Takbir	  in	  Arabic.	  Used	  in	  various	  contexts	  by	  Muslims,	  here	  it	  is	  in	  the	  call	  for	  prayer.	  	  It	  can	  also	  be	  used	  as	  an	  informal	  expression	  of	  faith,	  in	  times	  of	  distress,	  to	  express	  celebration	  or	  victory,	  or	  to	  express	  defiance	  or	  determination.	  	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  Ibid.	  p.	  2	  6	  Ibid.	  
	   2	  
ago. On this day, the infidel was the United States, and these men had decided that the 
Americans had to go.  
The men had been recruited by their leader, Lutf Bahr, from a mosque where he 
taught in Hudayah, a Red Sea port city located ninety-three miles southwest of Sana’a.7 
These men had dreamed of fighting and killing American soldiers in the battles 
happening in Baghdad or Fallujah in Iraq, Yemen had never been their first choice, 
however, travel restrictions forced them to consider carrying out operations against U.S. 
targets at home.8 The U.S. Embassy made for the perfect target; it was the symbol of U.S. 
presence in the nation, and to these men, a constant reminder of the infidel sitting in a 
Muslim land.  
As they got closer to the embassy, the men kept their speed down and tried to stay 
calm, for today was going to be their day, “we’re all a sacrifice for the messenger of 
God,” they repeated, breaking their sentences with cries of “Allahu Akbar”.9 The same 
words that had called the faithful to prayer and reflection only hours ago on this holy day 
during Ramadan were now driving seven radical men to war and certain death. The plan 
was simple enough; the first vehicle would crash into the main gate, exploding a hole in 
the embassy’s perimeter and allowing the second vehicle to enter the main compound and 
allow the men in it to kill as many Americans as possible.10 At 9:11 AM, Sana’a time, the 
two jeeps pulled up to the second checkpoint, having passed through the first thanks to 
the military license plates, and stopped.11 One of the men in the jeeps shouted to the two 
guards, Mukhtar al-Faqih and Taha Shumayla, “we have a general here to see the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Ibid.	  	  8	  Ibid.	  p.	  3	  9	  Ibid.	  10	  Ibid.	  p.	  4	  11	  Ibid.	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ambassador.”12 Neither of the guards had heard anything about a meeting, furthermore 
this was not protocol, since Ambassador Stephen Seche hardly ever met people at the 
embassy, preferring to go out to meetings.13 However, the ambassador didn’t consult with 
the guards on every one of his decisions, so the guards went continued with the process. 
Shumayla went first towards the jeeps to check IDs, while Mukhtar manned the gate.14 
The windows of the jeeps were tinted so darkly that Shumayla could not see inside them, 
this wasn’t right, Mukhtar was already pulling on the rope to raise the drop bar, which 
would allow the jeeps to go through, when Shumayla saw it: a man in the first jeep 
coming up through a hole in the roof of the first jeep holding an AK-47.15 “Ya, 
Mukhtar!” Shumayla shouted, “Run!”16  
It was at this time, approximately 9:12 AM, that the shooting started, three men 
jumped out of the second jeep and started firing as they ran, Shumayla was gone, fleeing 
to the protection of several concrete barriers.17 But Mukhtar waited, he had to get the bar 
down, as he let the rope slide from his hands, he hit the duck-and-cover alarm, the 
embassy’s early warning system, as the bar crashed back down.18 A few seconds was all 
it took, one bullet hit Mukhtar below the left shoulder; another hit him in the stomach, he 
managed to turn and run a few feet toward some rocks before a third bullet hit him in the 
back and exploded out of his chest, killing him.19 The terrorists knew at this point that 
key seconds had been lost, thanks to Mukhtar’s delaying tactics, and that the element of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ibid.	  13	  Ibid.	  14	  Ibid.	  15	  Ibid.	  16	  Ibid.	  17	  Ibid.	  	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Ibid.	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surprise was gone, but they had to go forward, they had crossed the point of no return. 
Each one of them knew that they would die today.  
Thus began one of the most harrowing days at Embassy Sana’a, although no one 
knew at this point, the brave actions of Mukhtar al-Faqih20, actions that cost him his life, 
had saved the U.S. Embassy. Nonetheless, nineteen people, including a Yemeni-
American Susan el-Baneh would die that day in what became the deadliest attack21 on a 
U.S. Embassy in a decade.22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  his	  actions	  on	  that	  day,	  Mukhtar	  al-­‐Faqih	  was	  posthumously	  awarded	  the	  Department	  of	  State’s	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  Star	  for	  Foreign	  Service	  for	  sacrificing	  his	  life	  and	  giving	  “the	  last	  full	  measure	  of	  devotion	  to	  his	  colleagues	  and	  friends.”	  The	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Sana’a	  reportedly	  hired	  his	  younger	  brother	  Muhammad	  to	  replace	  him	  as	  a	  security	  guard.	  	  21	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  questions	  have	  been	  raised	  about	  the	  level	  of	  complicity	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Yemen	  had	  in	  this	  attack.	  An	  al-­‐Qa’ida	  informant	  interviewed	  on	  the	  Al	  Jazeera	  news	  network	  has	  made	  allegations	  that	  Colonel	  Ammar	  Abdullah	  Saleh,	  nephew	  of	  then	  President	  Ali	  Abdullah	  Saleh,	  had	  provided	  al-­‐Qa’ida	  with	  money	  to	  buy	  the	  explosives	  used	  in	  this	  attack	  and	  the	  Saleh	  regime	  was	  using	  al-­‐Qa’ida	  as	  a	  way	  to	  receive	  U.S.	  funding.	  However,	  these	  allegations	  have	  not	  been	  substantiated	  by	  any	  other	  sources.	  	  22	  Knickmeyer,	  Ellen.	  "Toll	  in	  Yemen	  Rises,	  Includes	  American."	  The	  Washington	  Post.	  Washington	  Post	  Foreign	  Service,	  19	  Sept.	  2008.	  Web.	  6	  July	  2015.	  <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐dyn/content/article/2008/09/18/AR2008091800557.html?hpid=sec-­‐world>.	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CHAPTER II  
INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Yemen is a located in the southwestern part of the Arabian 
Peninsula, bordering Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the east. Yemen’s history 
stretches back thousands of years; the nation was home to the Sabean kingdom, which is 
mentioned in the Old Testament as Sheba. This kingdom presided over a fertile territory 
that was a center of trade in the region. In fact, the name ‘Yemen’ is derived from the 
Arabic root ymn, meaning either “prosperity”, to medieval Arab scholars, Yemen was 
always associated with a flourishing economy and wealth, or “right hand,” describing the 
country’s position to the Ka’bah in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred sanctuary.23  
Currently, however, the nation finds itself in the midst of turmoil. A major civil 
war continues unabated, with foreign players like Saudi Arabia being involved, a war that 
has worsened an already bad humanitarian crisis as resources dwindle because of 
hostilities. Additionally, Yemen faces an impending food and water crisis as more and 
more of its citizens go hungry and as resources diminish because of conflict and 
mismanagement. Furthermore, the nation finds itself becoming a sanctuary for some of 
the most radical and violent Islamic fundamentalist groups like al-Qa’ida and the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) with the current instability providing fertile ground for 
these organizations to plant the seeds of their violent creed. All of these crises along with 
the multiple secessionist movements, such as the Houthis in the north and the Southern 
Movement based in Aden, threaten to turn Yemen into a failed and fractured state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  "Yemen	  (San'a')."	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica.	  15th	  ed.	  Vol.	  19.	  Chicago:	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica,	  1980.	  1084-­‐1089.	  Print.	  
	   6	  
Along with the threat of a failed Yemen being used as a base for groups like al-
Qa’ida and ISIL to launch attacks globally, the failure of this country would also threaten 
the global economy, as Yemen borders the Bab-al-Mandeb strait. The strait is a key 
passageway for global shipping routes carrying goods from Europe and oil from the 
Middle East to nations in Asia and across the world. In 2014, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) estimated that up to 3.8 million barrels of oil passed 
through the Bab-al-Mandeb strait per day.24 Although this number is not that large when 
seen in context with the total amount of oil shipped daily through various routes, it is 
large enough to cause economic instability if the shipping route were to be disturbed.  
                    
Source: https://oilandgaslogistics.wordpress.com/2012/09/17/chokepoints-bab-el-
mandab/ 
  All of this chaos in Yemen comes at a time when the wider Middle East is going 
through a great period of instability with nations such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya dealing 
with a large amount of internal unrest and rising Islamic fundamentalism. Seen in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  Department	  of	  Energy.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration.	  World	  Oil	  
Transit	  Chokepoints	  Critical	  to	  Global	  Energy	  Security.	  By	  Alexander	  Metelitsa	  and	  Megan	  Mercer.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  1	  Dec.	  2014.	  Web.	  4	  July	  2015.	  <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991>.	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context, it can be argued that the instability in Yemen is another problem on a large list of 
problems Western policymakers have to deal with in the region. However, the problems 
that Yemen faces can very quickly become global problems. This is not to say that the 
other issues in the Middle East can be ignored, but to say that Yemen should not be put 
on the backburner. Furthermore, the global reach of violent Islamic fundamentalism 
makes it so no nation on the verge of collapse like Yemen in the Middle East can be 
ignored. 
The involvement that the United States has had within Yemen is founded upon 
good reasons. The nation of Yemen is clearly important geopolitically not only to the 
United States, but also to the rest of the world. However, as the conflict in Yemen 
becomes more complex, the ‘military option’ becomes less effective for the U.S. as 
previously thought in dealing with the intra-state conflicts.25 Thus, a more detail-oriented 
approach is needed, and policymakers need to be eased out of the ‘bomb our way to 
victory’ mindset. For this to happen, studies that explore other options to be used 
alongside the military option in the management and resolution of conflicts like the one 
in Yemen are critical. This thesis will explore and analyze the option of multi-track 
negotiation through application of systems theory as a way to deal with the conflict in 
Yemen. 
The rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups like al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) and, more recently, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Yemen is 
something that clearly has to be addressed. However, the problems in Yemen are deeper 
than the spreading of militant fundamentalism. AQAP and ISIL are dangerous, and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Nye,	  Joseph	  S.,	  Jr.	  "Soft	  Power	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy."	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  119.2	  (Summer,	  2004):	  255-­‐70.	  JSTOR.	  Web.	  3	  May	  2014.	  <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202345>. 
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spread in Yemen should worry policymakers in the West, however these groups are a 
symptom of a deeper disease. Thus, like any good doctor, the United States cannot 
simply treat the symptoms and think that the disease will disappear. 
This thesis will attempt to address the deeper disease that has taken root in 
Yemen, a disease that has made it so that basic needs of the people are not being met. In 
the first part, there will be a brief exploration of the country’s history along with the 
history of militancy in Yemen and the tribal politics of the society. Through this 
exploration, the reader will get an understanding of the ‘system’ that exists in Yemen. 
This is the ‘system’ that the SAT (Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional) model26 of 
systems theory will be applied to in the final part of the thesis. In this part there will be an 
exploration of the art and process of systems theory. Taken together, the parts will form a 
cohesive guide to understanding and potentially resolving the deeper systemic issues that 
underlie the current crisis in Yemen.  
By no means should this thesis be taken as a ‘silver bullet’ to the current issues 
that Yemen faces. However, the facts are that the Yemen is a nation that holds a high 
level of strategic importance to the United States, and the U.S. is involved in the nation. 
What this thesis is attempting to do is channel that involvement towards a constructive 
direction rather than the ‘business as usual’ approach that has been taken in Middle East 
policymaking. Implementation of the systems theory based approach advocated in this 
work will push the U.S. deeper into the situation in Yemen. And given the multitude of 
issues that the foreign policy machinery of the U.S. has to deal with, this is going to be no 
easy task. It will require long-term strategic thinking that will not follow preset timelines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ricigliano,	  Robert.	  Making	  Peace	  Last:	  A	  Toolbox	  for	  Sustainable	  Peacebuilding.	  Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Paradigm	  Publishers,	  2012.	  Print.	  p.	  21-­‐22.	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based on the political winds in Washington, however this is a task that needs to happen. 
The U.S. has, unfortunately already seen what can happen if nations are left to fail, and 
issues are not dealt with. Nevertheless, the issues that Yemen faces all have multiple 
layers of complexity; therefore the implementation of some single approach is something 
policymakers should avoid. What this thesis humbly attempts to do is introduce another 
tool in the policymaking toolkit, with the hope that it will be used at the right moment 
and through its use the resilient nation of Yemen can move on to a brighter future.  
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Yemen: Physical Map 
 
 
 
Source: https://www.google.com/maps/@15.5539046,48.1748476,7z 
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Yemen: Governorates 
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CHAPTER III  
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF YEMEN 
 
The Division of North and South Yemen  
 
 The division of Yemen between North and South Yemen officially occurred in the 
waning days of the Ottoman Empire in south Arabia. However, the regions that would 
become North and South Yemen, respectively, had been rarely governed as a single 
entity.27 In his work titled, Yemen Unity: Past and Future, Prof. F. Gregory Gause, III 
explored some of the reasons underlying these divisions. Many experts have looked at 
Yemeni history and have simply seen political divisions that encumbered the formation 
of a united nation. However, as Prof. Gause states there are many other, non-political 
reasons for this division.  
 
Source: http://wildstarlife.com/?p=598 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Gause,	  F.	  Gregory	  III.	  Yemeni	  Unity:	  Past	  and	  Future.	  Middle	  East	  Journal,	  Vol.	  42.	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1988),	  p.	  34.	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The first major issue was a very small resource base, resources that could have 
been used to create instruments of coercion and administration by potential state-builders 
was simply not present.28 Along with meager resources, strong tribal solidarity 
encouraged local revolts, this combined with the religious split between the Zaydi Shia29 
in the northern highlands and the Sunni Shafi’i30 everywhere else, made uniting the 
region into one nation a distant dream.31 The religious divisions existed alongside strong 
ethnic divisions, the Adnanis, who were ‘Arabized Arabs’32 having migrated into the 
region from Arabian Peninsula, and the Qahtanis, who dominated the south, and were 
considered ‘pure’ Arabs.33 British imperialists saw these divisions as an opportunity to 
expand into the region, and further solidified the split between North and South Yemen, 
leading to a deep fissure being created within the region.34  
This fissure is one that is still causing issues, the deep societal divisions that 
plague Yemen today can be traced to the historical points outlined above. These divisions 
have created essentially two Yemens, which at one point were a reality, but exist even 
today. The history presented here cannot and should not be ignored, Yemen as a nation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.	  29	  Zaydism	  is	  a	  school	  of	  though	  within	  Shia	  Islam.	  It	  is	  named	  after	  Imam	  Zaydi	  bin	  Ali,	  who	  was	  killed	  in	  an	  uprising	  against	  the	  Ummayyads.	  Although,	  Zaydism	  was	  at	  one	  point	  spread	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  Zaydis	  are	  now	  only	  found	  in	  significant	  numbers	  in	  Yemen.	  Traditionally,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  huge	  difference	  doctrinally	  between	  Zaydis	  and	  Sunnis.	  	  30	  Shafi’ism	  is	  a	  school	  of	  though	  within	  Sunni	  Islam.	  It	  is	  named	  after	  Imam	  al-­‐Shafi’i,	  and	  is	  one	  of	  four	  main	  schools	  of	  thought	  in	  Sunni	  Islam.	  Shafi’is	  are	  found	  across	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  and	  in	  Yemen	  they	  predominate	  in	  all	  the	  areas	  not	  mentioned	  as	  being	  ‘traditionally’	  Zaydi,	  and	  are	  the	  majority	  in	  the	  country.	  	  31	  Gause,	  F.	  Gregory	  III.	  Yemeni	  Unity:	  Past	  and	  Future.	  Middle	  East	  Journal,	  Vol.	  42.	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1988),	  p.	  34.	  32	  Arabized	  Arabs	  are	  people	  who	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  Arabs	  through	  conquest	  or	  migration.	  Arabization	  refers	  to	  the	  dynamic	  that	  occurs	  when	  a	  non-­‐Arab	  area	  comes	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Arab	  culture	  and	  slowly	  incorporates	  that	  culture	  and	  the	  Arab	  identity.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Adnanis,	  they	  became	  arabized	  when	  they	  moved	  into	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula.	  	  33	  Gandy,	  Christopher.	  A	  Mission	  to	  Yemen:	  August	  1962-­‐January	  1963.	  British	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  2	  (Nov.,	  1988),	  p.	  247.	  34	  Gause,	  F.	  Gregory	  III.	  Yemeni	  Unity:	  Past	  and	  Future.	  Middle	  East	  Journal,	  Vol.	  42.	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1988),	  p.	  34.	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exists as a political idea, underneath this idea exists a universe of divisions, political and 
religious. These divisions make Yemen an area full of complexities that will need to be 
understood before any intervention takes place. Many of these complexities have their 
roots in the long history of the nation.  
As was stated above, the true division of Yemen occurred at the end of the 
Ottoman Empire in Yemen. The establishment of Kingdom of Yemen, or the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen shows how the divisions, both ethnic and religious, 
crept into the creation of the first states in the region. The area that would become the 
modern day nation of Yemen had just been taken over by Imam Yahya Hamiduddin al-
Mutawakil, and this takeover had ushered in the Mutawakilite Kingdom of Yemen. King 
Yahya belonged to the al-Qasimi dynasty, a dynasty whose members were Zaydi Shia. 
The control of this area by King Yahya set up the rule of Zaydi Shia in the northern 
corner of Yemen for centuries to come. The Shia domination of northern Yemen 
continued to fuel the divisions within the region. These divisions along religious lines 
would become sharper as southern Yemen developed with a Sunni majority. In fact, this 
past of Shia domination in the north affects Yemen to this day. The Houthi rebels, who 
have come out of their northern strongholds to takeover the government in Sana’a, are 
also followers of Zaydi Shi’ism. One can trace a direct line from the establishment of the 
Kingdom of Yemen under Shia control to the rise of the Houthis. The Houthi movement 
itself began as a theological movement, to promote a Zaydi revival.35 Therefore, one can 
see how the shadow of the past still affects the day-to-day politics and society in Yemen.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Al	  Batati,	  Saeed.	  ‘Who	  are	  the	  Houthis	  in	  Yemen?’.	  Al	  Jazeera.	  http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-­‐houthis-­‐hadi-­‐protests-­‐201482132719818986.html.	  29	  March	  2015.	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After King Yahya’s takeover, the Mutawakkilite monarchy started modernization 
efforts, however some elite circles opposed these reforms and were influenced by the 
Arab nationalism, which had grown since its start in the 1930s and spread to many parts 
of the Middle East. This influence of the ideology became apparent in 1962 when Imam 
Ahmad bin Yahya died. His son succeeded him, but army officers attempted to seize 
power, sparking the North Yemen Civil War. This war pitted the royalist partisans of the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom and the supporters of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). 
 The YAR was established on September 27, 1962 when revolutionaries inspired 
by the Arab nationalist ideology of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had consolidated power in 
Egypt, which was called the United Arab Republic at this time, deposed the newly 
crowned King Muhammad al-Badr.36 These revolutionaries took control of Sana’a and 
established the Yemen Arab Republic.37 In this conflict, Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
supported Badr’s royalist forces Britain provided covert support. While the YAR troops 
were supported by the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and allegedly received warplanes 
from the Soviet Union38. The conflict involved both foreign irregular and conventional 
forces. Nasser supported the republicans with as many as 70,000 Egyptian troops and 
chemical weapons. Despite several military moves and peace conferences, the war sank 
into stalemate. Conflict continued periodically until 1967 when Egyptian troops were 
withdrawn. In 1968, the royalists mounted a final siege on Sana’a; following this siege 
most of the opposing leaders reached reconciliation. In 1970, Saudi Arabia recognized 
the Yemen Arab Republic, which was known as North Yemen.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Burrowes,	  Robert	  D.	  The	  Yemen	  Arab	  Republic’s	  Legacy	  and	  Yemeni	  Unification.	  Arab	  Studies	  
Quarterly,	  Vol.	  14,	  No.	  4	  (Fall	  1992),	  p.	  43.	  	  37	  Ibid.	  	  38	  Sandler,	  Stanley.	  Ground	  Warfare:	  The	  International	  Encyclopedia.	  Vol.1	  (2002):	  p.	  977.	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 One of the important aspects of this war was the amount of foreign intervention. 
Starting with Egypt, Nasser had looked to a regime change in Yemen since 1957, and 
finally put his desires into practice in January 1962 by giving the Free Yemen Movement 
support in Egypt. As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Britain provided 
support for the royalist side. This involvement by foreign powers started a dynamic in 
Yemen that has continued until today.  
 The result of this civil war was the official creation of two nations in what is 
known today as the nation of Yemen, South Yemen or the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen (PDRY) and North Yemen or the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Unlike other 
nations, which have been divided or are divided, like East and West Germany or North 
and South Korea, the YAR and the PDRY remained relatively friendly, however relations 
were often strained. The PDRY was a communist state, which had one major political 
party, the Yemeni Socialist Party. As far as foreign support was concerned the PDRY 
established close ties with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, East 
Germany, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  
 While the PDRY was able to get the support of the Eastern Bloc of nations, the 
YAR was not able to get the same connections. In 1972, the two states fought a war; the 
war was a short lived and small proxy conflict, which was resolved with a ceasefire and 
negotiations brokered by the Arab League, where it was declared that reunification would 
occur.39 However, these plans were put on hold in 1979, as the PDRY was finding 
communist rebels in the YAR, it was only through the intervention of the Arab League 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Halliday,	  Fred.	  Revolution	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  The	  Case	  of	  South	  Yemen,	  1967-­‐1987,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002,	  p.	  30.	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that fresh conflict was not started.40 The goal of unity between the two nations was 
reaffirmed by the heads of state of the YAR and the PDRY at a summit meeting in 
Kuwait in 1979. In 1980, PDRY president Abdul Fattah Ismail resigned and went to exile 
in Moscow, having lost the confidence of his supporters in the Kremlin.41 His successor, 
Ali Nasir Muhammad, took a less interventionist stance towards the YAR.  
War and Movement towards Unification 
 In 1986, a violent civil war started in the city of Aden within the PDRY. The 
conflict started after a failed coup and was rooted in ideological and tribal tensions 
between two factions within the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). At this point the 
assistance from the Soviet Union was propping up a weak economy, however this was all 
about to change. With the political situation in the PDRY worsening, President Ali Nasir 
Muhammad invited hardliners in his Politburo to a meeting and had them executed by his 
personal guards. This along with the tribal tensions, contributed greatly to the start of the 
civil war, the war resulted in the flight of President Muhammad to the north and the death 
of 10,000 South Yemenis.42 In the aftermath of this war, the PDRY found itself having 
lost more than half of its aid from the Soviet Union, because of the break up of the USSR, 
and with the possibility of oil reserves found on the border of the YAR and the PDRY, 
Ali Salim al-Beidh, one of the few high ranking official who survived the civil war, 
moved the two nations towards unification.43 In 1988, these moves towards unification 
started to pick up steam. They were driven by the worsening economic conditions in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Ibid.	  see	  p.	  32.	  	  41	  Halliday,	  Fred.	  Revolution	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  The	  Case	  of	  South	  Yemen,	  1967-­‐1987,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002,	  p.	  35.	  42	  Hurd,	  Robert	  and	  Noakes,	  Greg.	  North	  and	  South	  Yemen:	  Lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  Break-­‐up.	  Washington	  
Report	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  Affairs,	  July/August	  1994.	  p.	  48.	  43	  Coswell,	  Alan.	  2	  Yemens	  Let	  Animosity	  Fizzle	  into	  Coziness,	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  20,	  1989.	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PDRY, which were worsened by the domestic collapse of the nation’s main benefactor, 
the USSR.44 In December of 1989, North Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, an army 
officer who had come into power in 1978, and South Yemeni President al-Beidh, signed a 
draft constitution and agreed to a one-year timetable for unification.45 This move 
unification of the YAR and the PDRY caused much doubt across the region and the 
world. Charles Dunbar, the U.S. ambassador to the YAR during this period, wrote,  
“The reasons for these doubts were understandable. The period between 
South Yemeni independence on November 30, 1967, and the start of the 
final phase of unity negotiations—exactly 22 years later—was marked by 
dramatic unity initiatives, by two border wars between the YAR and the 
PDRY, by unending rhetoric about the “inevitably” of unification, and by 
growing cynicism among Yemeni officials predicted that, while there 
could be détente between north and south, real unity was at least 50 years 
away.”46 
 
There were multiple reasons as to why the leaders of the YAR and the PDRY 
were able to overcome the obstacles of mutual animosity and suspicion to unify Yemen. 
One of the major reasons was the global change that occurred with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, this change resulted in Moscow dramatically changing its aid policies 
towards the allies it had in Aden, the capital of the PDRY.47 This shift in the policy of the 
Kremlin resulted in the leadership of the PDRY feeling the need to strike the best deal 
with the YAR.  
 The other reasons for the unification were interrelated. In the 1980s, within the 
YAR, Saleh was left with a large amount of flexibility within the negotiations to unify 
Yemen. Saleh had a high personal stake in the unity initiative; also, the YAR had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Hurd,	  Robert	  and	  Noakes,	  Greg.	  North	  and	  South	  Yemen:	  Lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  Break-­‐up.	  Washington	  
Report	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  Affairs,	  July/August	  1994.	  p.	  48.	  45	  Ibid.	  46	  Dunbar,	  Charles.	  The	  Unification	  of	  Yemen:	  Process,	  Politics,	  and	  Prospects.	  The	  Middle	  East	  
Journal,	  Vol.	  46,	  No.	  3	  (Summer,	  1992),	  pp.	  456-­‐476.	  47	  Ibid.	  see	  p.	  463.	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experienced a consolidation of power by the national government in the tribal areas. As 
Dunbar states, “Saleh’s greater maneuverability vis-à-vis the tribes grew out of the 
evolution of the complex Yemeni-Saudi relationship, which was an important element 
influencing the success of the initiative.”48 To better understand how this unification 
came about, it would be helpful to take a brief look into the political and economic 
situations that existed in Sana’a and Aden in 1989.  
 By the fall of 1989, the government in Aden was facing a very limited set of 
options. The political situation was stagnant and divided, with multiple factions opposed 
to one another along regional and ideological lines.49 As Dunbar continues, “These splits 
sharply limited the regime’s ability to develop a clear policy direction. The only success 
the new PDRY leadership could claim was the rapprochement with the YAR that 
produced the joint investment zone...”50 The economy of the YAR was also suffering. 
Land and fisheries reforms had produced declines in agricultural production, and the port 
of Aden, which was one of the busiest global ports under British rule, played almost no 
role in global commerce. Industrial production had also declined, and despite the long 
time rule of a socialist government, more than half of the GNP still came from the private 
sector.51 The worst part of the PDRY’s economy could be seen in the petroleum sector. 
The discovery of oil in the YAR by the U.S. corporation Hunt Oil in 1984 had led to 
exports of 200,000 barrels of oil a day. The Soviets had also discovered oil in the north, 
right across the border in the PDRY, however all this resulted in was the YAR falling in 
debt for $500 million with “sixty or so mostly non-functioning wells, a pipeline suspected 
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  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.	  see	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  Ibid.	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of leaking, an outmoded oil processing complex, and a few barrels of crude oil trucked 
sporadically to Aden’s decrepit refinery.”52 
 All of this came with the global backdrop of one of the YAR’s biggest 
international supporters breaking apart and cutting the aid that Aden received from 
Moscow. This military and economic aid that the Soviets had provided was vital to 
survival of the government in Aden.53 The government in Aden pushed for limited 
economic liberalization in the hopes of revitalizing the national economy, however this 
move came to be seen as too little, too late and proved to be a failure. All of these factors 
greatly contributed to the leaders in Aden to take seriously the offer that the PDRY gave 
as far as unification was concerned. To understand this push for unification further, it 
would be helpful to look at the political dynamics, which were dominating Sana’a at this 
time. This brief overview will also allow for an understanding of struggle between the 
central government and tribal leaders, a struggle, which dominates Yemeni politics to this 
day.  
 Since the creation of the YAR in 1962, the feature that dominated North Yemeni 
politics “had been the struggle between the central government and tribal leaders, whose 
base of support lay primarily in the northern and eastern parts of the country.”54 The 
government in Sana’a had little control in the hinterlands after the creation of the YAR. 
The tribes controlled the roads via checkpoints; justice in these areas was tribal rather 
than governmental, and governmental social services were quite limited.55 The tribes’ 
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main opposition to the unification plan was that they considered the south to be an 
atheistic and alien entity.  
 In the 1980s the relationship between the government in Sana’a and the tribes 
began to slowly change. Through a conscientious effort the government extended its 
control over the tribal areas, extending its reach into the tribal strongholds in the northern 
and eastern areas.56 The keys to the successful exertion of control in these areas were 
construction of schools and hospitals in the tribal areas; all of this was helped by the 
discovery of oil in the Marib province in central Yemen, which was in the heart of tribal 
territory.57 These developments allowed the government to provide the jobs in the tribal 
regions that it could not provide before. This development, in turn, allowed Sana’a to get 
the loyalty of the tribal leaders and members. However, this is not to say that the tribes 
have been completely pacified, the tensions between them and the national government 
continue to this day, as will be explored in a later chapter.  
 The expansion of government authority in the tribal areas created a new dynamic 
in the relationship of the tribes and the government. This new relationship resulted in a 
change in the position of the tribal leaders. People, who were previously the major 
sources of power and patronage in their regions, were now vying for favors that the 
government was in a position to give.58 This new relationship between the tribal leaders 
and the national government made it so the leaders of the tribes were much more willing 
to go along with the national government’s major foreign policy maneuvers.59 With the 
tribes willing to go along, the government in Sana’a led by President Saleh was able to 
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have a freer hand than before to pursue the goal of unification. Thus, President Saleh was 
able to conduct the negotiations with the confidence that the push for unification would 
not provoke the tribes to create a crisis like they had in the past, a crisis that had led to 
changes of government in Sana’a.60 As Dunbar points out, “The neutralization of tribal 
opposition to unity was probably the most important North Yemeni contribution to the 
success of the unification effort.”61 
 Aside from having gained the loyalty of the tribes that was needed for the 
unification effort to go forward, Saleh had at least three major political interests in 
seeking unification in 1989. These interests show how unification essentially became a 
necessity for the government in Sana’a and thus ensured the marriage of two separate 
entities. The first reason that Saleh had was a personal one, he felt strongly, that if 
unification were to succeed, he would be the one to reap the political rewards for being 
the architect of the unification process. Second, Saleh was in desperate need for 
economic and political success. Both at home and abroad many of the economic success 
that Saleh was touting were failing.62 The elite of the YAR were realizing that no matter 
what Saleh was saying as far as the oil bonanza was concerned or any other economic 
progress that was being talked about, the nation remained one of the poorest in the 
world.63 The government in Sana’a was anxious to change this perception and the 
unification with the PDRY would allow for the YAR to tap into the oil wealth that 
existed just south of its border.64 
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 Finally, Saleh needed unity to strengthen the position of the national government 
vis-à-vis the tribes. In the YAR, tribal members made up about half of the population, 
which allowed them a significant voice in politics. To consolidate the government’s 
power and to essentially ‘dilute’ the voice of the tribes, Saleh needed the introduction of 
2 million South Yemenis to the polity.65 This would, in turn, allow for the creation of a 
new country in which the tribes would not have that much power, since they would no 
longer command a majority. Saleh would, therefore, be able to have a country in which 
the tribes’ ability to oppose the central government would be greatly limited.66 The other 
benefit Saleh would accrue from the unification was the access to the much more 
disciplined southern army whose officers had no ties of loyalty to the tribes, unlike the 
ones in the YAR. This lack of loyalty would allow for the government to move against 
the tribes in case the need arose.67 The roots of the divide between the national 
government and the tribes can be seen with these early policies.  
 Another point that should be explored in this early history of Yemen is the 
nation’s relation with its northern neighbor, Saudi Arabia, a relationship that is also 
relevant to the present situation in Yemen. As pointed out in the introduction, Yemen has 
recently fallen into a crisis, which has put the country on the brink of a civil war. This 
conflict involves multiple parties, one of which is Saudi Arabia. However, the 
involvement of Saudi Arabia in the internal politics of its southern neighbor is nothing 
new. In fact, the Saudis have been involved with Yemen since its unification and even 
before that. In the days of the YAR and the PDRY, the involvement of Saudi Arabia 
made of a complex trilateral relationship. As Dunbar points out, there were multiple 	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incidents and issues that caused the tension and the complexity in the relationship of the 
three nations. He states, the “Yemeni resentment caused by the military defeat and loss of 
territory to Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, Saudi backing for the royalists in the 1962-1970 
North Yemeni revolution and civil war, and Riyadh’s suspicion of the Marxist regime in 
the PDRY and its pressure on Sana’a and Aden to reach a boundary agreement...”68 had 
strained the relationship between the nations.  
 Even though the relationships were at best strained, Sana’a needed to maintain a 
good relationship with Riyadh. There were many reasons for this necessity, top of which 
lay the fact that until the Gulf crisis peaked in the latter end of 1990, Saudi Arabia was 
YAR’s leading donor.69 Saudi Arabia also provided a welcome employment destination 
for about 1.5 million Yemenis; these Yemenis formed a much-needed source of foreign 
currency exchange for both the YAR and the PDRY.70 By the end of the 1980s, the 
Yemeni-Saudi relationship had evolved to the point that there was very little Saudi 
opposition left to the move towards unification.71 As this opposition was fading, a 
concern grew amongst Yemenis about alleged Saudi opposition to the unification, this 
concern allowed for the negotiations to be sped up.72 As 1989 drew to a close, the main 
constraints to the unification of Yemen, Soviet support for the southern leadership and 
the ability of the northern tribes to block unification, had disappeared and a new nation 
was ready to be formed.  
 The Republic of Yemen was declared on May 22, 1990. Ali Abdullah Saleh of the 
north became the Head of State, and Ali Salim al-Beidh became the Head of 	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Government. This new state and government agreed to a constitution in May 1990, and 
the populace ratified the constitution in May 1991.73 This new constitution affirmed 
Yemen’s commitment to free elections, a multiparty political system, the right to own 
private property, equality under the law, and the respect of basic human rights.74 In April 
of 1993, the first Parliamentary elections were held, which were monitored by multiple 
international organizations.75 With this unification, greater Yemen was under the control 
of one government for the first time in in centuries, and the new constitution also held the 
promise of a government founded on stable principles, which the populace hoped would 
last.  
However, the lasting tensions of the division continued to boil under the surface, 
until they came back. As the government consolidated its power, a new oil field was 
brought online in the Hadramaut Governorate in the south, many southerners started 
feeling that their land, under which existed most of the oil reserves, was illegally being 
appropriated as part of a conspiracy by the rulers in the north.76 This issue along with 
other grievances, led to conflicts within the coalition government, which resulted in the 
self-imposed exile of Vice President Al-Beidh beginning in August 1993.77 The resulting 
instability led to deterioration in general security that allowed for political rivals to settle 
scores and tribal elements to take advantage of the unstable situation. All of this paved 
the way for the coming civil war. 
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In this opening chapter, the historical division between North and South Yemen 
has been explained. However, through this analysis we have also seen the multiple strains 
of other divisions that continue to plague Yemen even though the official boundaries 
between the YAR and the PDRY have broken down. Overall, there exist three major 
divisions within Yemeni society, and this chapter has shown the various strains of those 
divisions. The first is the religious division, between the Zaydi Shia and the Sunnis in 
Yemen. This division manifested itself at the founding of the Kingdom of Yemen (North 
Yemen) under King Yahya and has undergirded the development of Yemen ever since. 
This religious division is seen even today within the societal and political makeup of the 
Yemeni state, the Zaydi Shia Houthis are pitted against Sunni tribes and AQAP, which 
also espouses radical Sunni beliefs.  
However, this division isn’t that clean either, traditionally speaking, Zaydi Shia 
and Shafi’i Sunnis have gotten along just fine.78 Therefore, it would be wrong to paint the 
situation in Yemen with a broad brush simply along religious lines. For example, it would 
be erroneous to “say that Houthis = Zaydis, and, say, Al-Ahmar [another major tribe in 
Yemen] = Shafi’is. Or even worse, Houthis = Shias, and Al-Ahmar = Sunnis.”79 One 
issue with the clean divisions that one would want is that many in the Al-Ahmar tribe are, 
like the Houthis, followers of Zaydi Shi’ism.80 One could, from reading what has just 
been stated, come to the conclusion that what is happening within Yemen is really a 
conflict within the Zaydi Shia, however, that would also be incorrect. If one were to put a 
religious element on the Houthis it would be that they espouse a more ‘hardcore’ or 	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fundamentalist version of Zaydism.81 As was pointed out before, the Houthis were borne 
out of a desire of Zaydi revivalism, and they tend to see the other tribes as people who are 
Zaydi in name only. The story gets even more complicated as the Al-Ahmars have, in the 
past, accused the Houthis of secretly not being Zaydi anymore, and instead being 
Twelver Shia, the Shia who predominate Iran.82 This pulls in the political divisions that 
run through the Middle East, since by accusing the Houthis of being Twelver Shia, the 
Al-Ahmars stoke the regional fears of Iranian dominance and can paint themselves as the 
true defenders of Yemen and Zaydism.  
This division bleeds into the second major division within Yemen, that of 
ethnicity. The ethnic division in Yemen was mentioned above through the Adnanis and 
the Qahtanis, two powerful families in Yemen who trace their lineage to two different 
ethnic roots. This ethnic division amongst the various tribes is one to keep in mind, and a 
division that will continue to manifest itself in the historical narrative. The tribes and 
their ethno-religious lineages form a very important part of Yemeni society, a part that 
has to be considered when looking into potential intervention in Yemen. The third major 
division within Yemen is the political one, this division is one that overlays the other two. 
Earlier, when discussing the division of North and South Yemen, it was shown how 
differing political ideologies led to the different nations being formed, and how the 
waning of some of those ideologies led to unification.  
However, unification by no means erased the political divisions within Yemen, at 
best, unification simply put a cover on the divisions. The main political actor to come 
into power after unification, Ali Abdullah Saleh, brought an autocratic system of 	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governance that quieted the political divisions within Yemen through oppressive 
government control and force. Along with this system of governance, Saleh found 
himself in power when the western backers of his regime wanted a quite Yemen and 
therefore backed him financially and politically. All of that ended with the revolution in 
2011, and now we see the political divisions in Yemen laid bare. With a multitude of 
political actors vying for power, the situation on the ground is quite complex. The 
Houthis, and the weak national government, two parties that have differing political 
interests, are both up against the fundamentalist governance model that AQAP espouses. 
All of this is in the mix with the major international players, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran, who have their own political interests. There is also present a secessionist 
movement in southern Yemen based in Aden, which, because of unaddressed grievances 
arising from unification, want separation from the nation, all of these political actors and 
their interests makeup a very complex political situation.  
The three major divisions, religious, ethnic, and political, all combine and act 
separately to make the current situation in Yemen one that should cause great concern 
internationally. As we continue onto the next chapters and explore the historical 
development of Yemen, it would be wise to keep in mind these divisions. The importance 
of these divisions is not simply so one can appreciate the history of this troubled nation, 
but also because understanding these divisions and the complexities they create on the 
ground is key in formulating whatever response will be given to the current crisis.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MODERN YEMEN 
 
Civil War 
 As was stated in the last chapter, in 1990, the two separate nations of North 
Yemen and South Yemen were united under the flag of the Republic of Yemen. However 
tensions, stemming from the deep-seated political divisions, remained between the two 
regions. These tensions increased as the new national government based in Sana’a started 
consolidating its control by incorporating newly found oil fields in the south. This in turn, 
made many southerners feel that the national government, dominated by people who 
were in the government in North Yemen, was illegally taking their land in a bid to retain 
power over the south. This issue, led to a political crisis that saw the self imposed exiled 
of Vice President al-Beidh.83 This exile began a series of events that resulted in Yemen 
falling into a civil war. This is what will be explored in this section, along with the effects 
this civil war had on the development of Yemen and how lingering animosities between 
the north and south still affect Yemeni society today.  
 However, before the actual war is explored, it would be helpful to look into the 
political situation, as it existed right after unification occurred. Unification brought about 
an integrated government in Yemen, nevertheless this was an uneasy integration at best. 
While the presidency went to Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Vice Presidency to al-Beidh, 
the post of prime minister was given to a veteran southern politician, Haider Abu Bakr al-
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Attas.84 The cabinet seats were halved between the members of Saleh’s General People’s 
Congress (GPC) and Beidh’s Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP).85 During this integration 
period, a decision was made, which would come back to haunt the young nation. It was 
decided by the national government, that the integration of the northern and southern 
armed forces would be delayed, thus, while 15,000 southern troops were moved to the 
north and 8,000 northern soldiers posted to the south, the armies remained under separate 
commands.86 At this point, the tensions within the new government were becoming 
apparent, with increased conflicts amongst the governing elite. Although the former 
PDRY was larger geographically, the ex-YAR held 80% of the estimated 13 million 
Yemenis; this caused the southern leadership to push for a speedy integration so that it 
could consolidate its political power.87  
Additionally, the introduction of ex-Marxist southern leaders into an already 
fragile network of party and tribal leaders in the north caused considerable political 
disruption.88 The first multiparty elections were held in April of 1993, and they resulted 
in a lopsided victory for the northern GPC with the southern YSP coming in a 
disappointing third place.89 These elections also brought in a third political player, the Al-
Islah party, led by the influential Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid tribal 
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confederation, who became speaker of the parliament.90 Therefore, the 50-50 split that 
existed between the GPC and the YSP became an uneven three-way partnership. 
 These elections left the southern political leaders fearful of northern dominance in 
the new political makeup of Yemen; this fear resulted in the unsworn Vice President 
leaving Sana’a in August of 1993.91 Vice President al-Beidh set up his base in Aden, the 
southern port city in Yemen, and issued a series of conditions for his return to Sana’a; the 
conditions centered on the security of the YSP. However, Beidh’s prolonged absence 
paralyzed the newly formed national government in Sana’a, within the political turmoil, a 
campaign of assassination claimed about 150 YSP leaders and heightened tension 
throughout Yemen.92 Initially, moves were made towards reconciliation, early on, Beidh 
suggest that both him and Saleh resign to break the impasse, the Jordanians also stepped 
in to broker a deal which was signed in February, however that deal collapsed as forces 
from the north and south exchanged sporadic gunfire.93 The outbreak of open fighting 
between the two armies started on May 4th, with the southern forces in the north being 
attacked, with this fighting, President Saleh declared a 30-day state of emergency and 
dismissed all southerners from the government.94 
 The seeds of this war had been laid much before the actual start of the conflict. 
Many experts at the time of the unification were skeptical about the nation actually being 
viable as a united country. There were many reasons for doubt; but the major issue was 
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the increasingly poisonous conflicts between the northern and southern elites.95 At this 
point, it would be valid to point out that a conflict that has divided Yemen to this day was 
borne not out of a division amongst the people, but a division amongst the elites in 
society. Both Saleh and Beidh were strong personalities who saw deficiencies in the way 
the newly unified Yemen was setup. Beidh saw Saleh as unresponsive to the concerns of 
the south, particularly to the concerns of the YSP, and was determined to amass as much 
power as possible.96 Saleh contributed to this anger by failing to arrest and punish the 
people who killed YSP leaders, among whom were some of Beidh’s extended family, he 
also made the move of sacking the YSP leadership, which angered Beidh further.97 Saleh, 
on the other hand, believed that Beidh and the YSP held unrealistic aspirations for the 
south in a unified Yemen, with only a fifth of the population, the south wanted to 
maintain a 50 percent stake in the government.98  
 Alongside the conflicts amongst the elites, there also existed the problem of the 
unmet expectations the south had for unification. One of the major reasons for the push 
for unification in the south was the access to the stronger northern economy that would 
occur, however, because of Saleh’s support of Saddam Hussein on the 1990 Persian Gulf 
War, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries expelled more than half the Yemeni 
workers working in those states.99 This expulsion of workers made it so that the 
expatriate remittances that the northern economy relied on plummeted.100 The other 
economic factor that had formed a major reason for the push for unification was Yemeni 
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oil production. There were two issues within this larger issue of oil production, one 
problem was the lack of production increases that occurred because of Saudi Arabia’s 
warnings for foreign companies against doing business in Yemen because above 
mentioned support of Saddam by Saleh.101 The other was the recognition by the south 
that although the north held multiple natural gas reserves, the largest oil deposits actually 
existed in the former PDRY.102 This made it so Beidh realized that the north, instead of 
becoming the economic boon that he thought it would be after unification, had become a 
drag on the economy of the south.  
 If the divisions had stayed at the elite levels, the civil war would have been the 
end of the issue. However, the divisions spread into the populace, which, combined with 
the violence of the civil war made the conflicts seeped into the very social fabric of 
Yemeni society. This dynamic made it so the divisions that could have been relegated to 
history made it all the way to present and affect Yemeni society and politics today. The 
reason for the divisions were felt at the societal level was fairly simple; the fact was that 
the former YAR and the former PDRY were, in reality, different societies. These 
societies shared some aspects, but differed in some key ones also. The differences 
between the two societies were not going to simply be resolved through unification, 
especially a unification that had deep conflicts amongst the political elite.  
 There were many differing societal norms between the YAR and the PDRY, 
which, upon unification, the people came face to face with. For example, the north was 
and is a socially conservative, and largely tribal society with numerous centers of power, 
whereas the south retains much of the socialist and secularist outlook of its Marxist past, 	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along with its experience of a heavily centralized economy.103 One example of the 
differing social norms that existed between north and south Yemen is the amount of 
women in leadership positions. The Washington, D.C. based National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs stated in a report it published during the 1993 elections 
that, “There are several female judges in southern Yemen but none in northern Yemen, 
and there is apparently only one practicing female lawyer in northern Yemen.”104 The 
report goes on to mention how this under-representation, according to most Yemenis, of 
women in positions of leadership is because of the conservative, tribal social structure 
and the most women, especially in the north, are not encouraged to complete their 
education.105 In the south, the situation was different where promoting education for 
women was a government priority, unfortunately at the time of the unification, this trend 
was not seen in the unified government.106  
This issue of the lack of women in leadership positions is not one to be simply 
brushed aside, instead the issue points to deeper social differences in the norms of the 
north and the south. All of these differences in social norms coalesced during unification 
and forced two societies with similar cultures to realize the differences between social 
norms amongst them. As unification occurred, many in the north, especially, the Islamists 
and the rural population, feared the impact of the secularist south, southerners were afraid 
that the new north dominated government in Sana’a would roll back the PDRY’s liberal 
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social legislation.107 These fears were realized when; in May of 1992 the Saleh’s 
Presidential Council passed a personal status law that revoked a woman’s right to sue for 
divorce unless she could prove abuse.108 These differences in social norms combined 
with the contentious political battles amongst the elites made it clear that the unified 
nation of Yemen was not one that could stay together. 
 The actual fighting in the war was characterized by the resistance in the south 
entrenching itself for a drawn out fight.109 Although the northern forces outnumbered the 
forces of the south, the south used its greater air power to good effect.110 In the battle for 
Aden, which many observers thought would fall quickly, the air power of the south 
bogged down the offensive of the northern forces for days, which allowed the south to 
regroup and strengthen defenses around Aden.111  
 The leadership in Sana’a dismissed Aden’s pleas for a cease-fire as a delaying 
tactic, and as a result Beidh declared the independence of the southern Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (DRY) on May 21, 1994.112 There was no international recognition 
of the DRY, and in mid-May, northern forces began a push toward Aden, with the key 
city of Ataq, which allowed access to Yemen’s oil fields, falling to the northern forces on 
May 24.113 The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 924 on June 1, 1994 
calling for an end to the fighting and a cease-fire, which was established on June 6, but 
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only lasted six hours; at this time the peace talks that were going on in Cairo also fell 
apart.114 The northern forces entered Aden on July 4, and fully captured the city in about 
three days, most of the resistance quickly collapsed and the top southern military and 
political leaders fled into exile.115 Official figures estimated between 7,000 and 10,000 
casualties from the fighting.116  
 One of the other elements in this war had been the foreign involvement. Yemenis 
not new to foreign powers being involved, and this situation was no different. The 
regional powers quickly chose sides in the conflict, with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, minus Qatar, tilted towards Beidh and the south.117 
Most analysts and experts at that time agreed that this official stance by Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf nations was borne out of the distaste they felt towards Saleh’s support for 
Saddam in the Persian Gulf War, this made it so that very few Saudis were comfortable 
with the idea of Saleh ruling a single, strong state at their southern border.118 Alongside 
this official support, many wealthy Saudi families have family ties to the southern 
Hadramaut region in Yemen, and may also have offered clandestine support to Beidh’s 
forces.119  
This support for the south originating from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations is 
not something that only happened during this first civil war in Yemen, it is a support base 
that has continued to this day. In fact, looking at the current conflict within Yemen, the 	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key support that the non-Houthi forces are receiving is coming from Saudi Arabia going 
as far as the Saudis getting directly involved in military activities. The familial 
connections of the Saudi elite with the people in the southern Yemen is something that 
has to be kept in mind when looking at the dynamics of the current conflict, and potential 
ways to resolve it. With Saleh, his support base was limited to the small support that 
Saddam’s regime in Iraq could provide in return for Saleh’s support during the Persian 
Gulf War. However, this support was limited to Iraqi newspapers starting a print 
campaign against King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and some expertise provided by the Iraqi 
military.120 
Overall, this civil war at the outset of unification sowed the seeds of division and 
strife deep within the Yemeni social fabric. These seeds of division would continue to 
plague Yemen as it entered the modern period of the late 1990s. Saleh had won the war, 
but had inherited a Yemen that was held together by force. It was a broken nation, a 
nation which had suffered greatly because of the conflict, this new Yemen was one that 
lacked the conditions for a strong centralized government, and Saleh had very few 
options as far as coaxing the south to come along with economic incentives, because this 
would have angered the northern tribes.121 The southern half of Yemen was one in which 
infrastructure worth millions of dollars had been destroyed because of the fighting, with a 
populace that had suffered great personal costs because of the war.122 Other costs of the 
fleeing of foreign investment capital, and the leaving of foreign resident community, 
most of which worked in crucial areas such as health, education, construction, and 
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petroleum services.123 On top of all of this, Saleh had gotten himself a Yemen that was 
alienated from both the regional and global community, because of his support of 
Saddam. The work of the four years that had been put in to building a united Yemen had 
been destroyed in a matter of weeks and whatever goodwill had been fostered between 
the north and south had also been lost.124 
The results of the civil war had been bad, however, it should not be a surprise that 
the civil war broke out in the first place. The Yemen that was created at unification was 
never truly unified in the first place since the divisions were present at two levels. The 
first division existed at the political level, amongst the elites, specifically Saleh and 
Beidh. Alongside the personal political divisions between Saleh and Beidh there existed 
the economic and political divisions between the north and the south, especially amongst 
the YSP and the GPC.  
The secondary set of divisions existed at the societal level. With the north and 
south having differing sets of political, economic, and social norms amongst themselves. 
This set of divisions was highlighted by the difference that existed between a 
predominantly conservative and Islamist north versus a secularist south. In the north the 
population was generally rural, and therefore had a much different economic lifestyle 
than the south, which existed under a centralized economic system. This dual division 
made it so the nation of Yemen was never really unified, and the civil war only 
exacerbated this issue. By defeating the south, Saleh did force a unified Yemen to exist, 
but he did not meet the deeply help southern interests. These interests would be covered 
up under the authoritarian rule of the Saleh regime, only to fester and continue to create 	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tension that would erupt in 2011 in the midst of the Arab Spring and bring about the 
current crisis in Yemen.  
Continuing Instability and Conflict 
 The years after the civil war were marked with Saleh and his GPC consolidating 
power and control over Yemen. In the first parliamentary elections held post-civil war in 
1997, the GPC won a landslide victory against the Islamic Al-Islah party; the GPC took 
187 of the 301 seats contested.125 The YSP boycotted this election alleging that the 
government had harassed and arrested their party workers.126 These allegations against 
Saleh’s government were not ones to be taken lightly, the issues that the YSP faced 
further deepened the divisions that existed between the north and south. With this, the 
nation that had been unified through a civil war found itself mired in political instability.  
 In 1999, Yemen held its first presidential elections; the main contenders for the 
seat were Ali Abdullah Saleh of the GPC and an Independent candidate Najeeb Qahtan 
Al-Sha’abi.127 Saleh won the election with 96 percent of the vote; the YSP again 
boycotted the election.128 With both the parliamentary and the presidential elections 
behind him Saleh had consolidated his control over the nation, however, given that the 
YSP had boycotted both of the major elections, the serious divisions in Yemen remained. 
During the 1990s, Yemen had essentially become a pariah state, with very little support 
or connections of even the Gulf nations in its neighborhood. The reason for this status 
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was the ill-fated decision by Saleh to support Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War. 
Because of this support, Yemen had not only lost the backing of Saudi Arabia, but also 
the support of the United States, which had put its relations with Yemen in a diplomatic 
freeze.  
 This situation that Yemen found itself in did not bode well for its economy. With 
the support of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gone, the weak Yemeni economy became 
weaker. Added to this was the lack of support coming in from the West, and for a nation 
which had depended mostly on aid from other nations in the region and the world to 
support its economy, Yemen found itself in dire economic straits. In 1996, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted Yemen a $190 million stand-by credit 
facility, and the following year it approved two funding facilities that increased the 
country's credit by approximately US$500 million.129 The funding was contingent on 
Yemen's adoption of stringent economic reforms, a requirement that the country had 
limited success in fulfilling. As a result, the IMF suspended lending to Yemen from late 
1999 until February 2001.130 These economic conditions meant that Yemen would face a 
bleak future, and with the internal divisions that existed within the nation, the situation 
was rife for conflict to begin. The conditions on the ground in Yemen were made much 
more difficult with the poor economy also.  
 By the end of the 1990s Yemen had gained a reputation for being one of the 
poorest, if not the poorest, nations in the Middle East. However, as the new millennium 
dawned, a new force would make its mark in the troubled history of this nation and pull it 
into the global conflict that would become known as the “War on Terror”. This force was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division.	  Country	  Profile:	  Yemen.	  N.p.,	  Aug.	  2008.	  Web.	  2	  June	  2015.	  <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf>.	  130	  Ibid.	  
	   42	  
not one that appeared suddenly. The seeds for the rise of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, which 
would later become known as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had been laid 
much earlier, in the 1980s when the PDRY and the YAR were still two separate nations. 
Saleh had established and supported an Islamist insurgency in South Yemen, and Osama 
bin Laden himself was asked to establish the “volunteer” mujahideen131 units to bolster 
the ranks of the anti-Communist insurgency in Aden.132  
 The history of the rise of AQAP is tied with the history of the rise of Islamic 
terrorism coming out of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. However, it is also 
tied up to the history of South Yemen and the history of one of the most powerful tribes 
in the south. This history will show not only the rise of an increasingly dangerous branch 
of al-Qa’ida but also how societally Yemen had the ingredients necessary for such a 
potent insurgency to grow. With this analysis we will see reach of AQAP and the 
complexity that this group adds to the current crisis in Yemen.   
CHAPTER V 
 
 TERROR COMES TO YEMEN 
 
The Rise of AQAP 
 Before diving into the history of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, it would be useful to take a 
moment to understand why it is important to explore this history. Yemen is a nation in 
which history plays a great role in the present and inevitably affects decisions that pertain 
to the future. The end goal of this work is for it to assist in the formulation of the 	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resolution to the current crisis that has engulfed the nation of Yemen. The present crisis is 
one that is rooted very much in the past and therefore, any attempt to resolve it via 
negotiation and diplomacy will have to be informed by this past. The current divisions, 
both political and social, the tribal animosities, and even the current presence of al-Qa’ida 
all have their roots in the past within this nation. If this past history is not explored in 
detail and analyzed, no amount of involvement in the present or the future will 
completely resolve the crisis. Along with this exploration of history, this chapter will also 
analyze AQAP and how the group continues to be so resilient in the country. 
 Many people in the west think that al-Qa’ida first showed its face in 2000 when 
the group carried out the attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel in 
Aden. This is incorrect, jihad in Yemen, as it was pointed out above, had its beginning in 
the 1980s when Saleh used returning mujahideen from Afghanistan to fuel an insurgency 
in the South Yemen. However, even this story goes back further than that. One of the 
major players in the insurgency against the PDRY was Tariq al-Fadhli, a member of the 
powerful al-Fadhli tribe and the son of the last sultan of Aden, Nasir bin Abdullah al-
Fadhli.133 The elder al-Fadhli was the leader of the al-Fadhli tribe and the last sultan of 
Aden, who ruled vast areas of the southern Yemeni province of Abyan.134 After the 
British pulled out of South Yemen in 1967, however, the elder al-Fadhli lost his lands 
and power to the new rulers of South Yemen, the Marxists of the YSP.135 The al-Fadhli 
family moved to Saudi Arabia, where Tariq grew up, but abandoned his education and 
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joined the mujahideen movement in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviet forces.136 
Yemen currently faces a secessionist movement in the south called the Southern 
Movement; this movement will be discussed in detail in a later section. However, it is 
worth mentioning that the roots of the Southern Movement lie in the taking of the al-
Fadhli tribe’s land by the YSP, therefore any resolution to the current conflict in Yemen 
will have to involve the Southern Movement and their needs will have to be met.  
The Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) 
 The story of jihad being established in Yemen continued during the civil war that 
was fought between the North and the South after unification. At this point Saleh turned 
to Tariq al-Fadhli and instructed him to join the fight against the South immediately.137 
The assistance that the jihadis led by al-Fadhli provided was vital for the north being 
successful in the war, and al-Fadhli was awarded a senior position in Saleh’s new 
government.138 However, during this same time period, many mujahideen were returning 
from Afghanistan and were joining the fight against South Yemen, these returning 
Yemenis were joined by Arab veterans of the Afghan war, foremost among them Osama 
bin Laden, who advocated a central role for Yemen in global jihad.139 A corps of jihadis 
who had trained under Bin Laden in Afghanistan formed the militant group Islamic Jihad 
in Yemen (IJY), which existed from 1990-1994, one of several AQAP predecessors.140 
The IJY was comprised of Yemenis and other Arabs who were returning from the Afghan 
war, the majority of returning Yemenis integrated into society without much of an issue, 	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however, a small minority returned from Afghanistan committed to violent regime 
change throughout the Arab world.141 For many of these returning warriors, the 
conditions of jihad seemed strongest at home, the Yemeni veterans of the Afghan war 
quickly joined a disparate mix of royalist, Wahhabi, tribal and disaffected southern 
elements, all of whom were unified by their dislike of the PDRY’s socialist regime.142 
 This group formed what would become the core of the IJY, however, a more 
important and dangerous individual was also present amongst these veterans and he was 
becoming one the main financial backers of the IJY. The involvement of bin Laden in 
Yemen during this period allowed for two things to occur. First, he became the main 
source of funding for the IJY, as was noted by Noman Benotman, one of bin Laden’s 
colleagues and a later head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, bin Laden began 
spending, “a lot of money [on the jihad in Yemen] in ‘88, ’89, ’90,” diverting resources, 
arms and recruits from Afghanistan to southern Yemen.143 Second, it gave the 
mujahideen across the Arab world returning from Afghanistan a cause to gather around 
and join. Bin Laden financed this fight in southern Yemen from his apartment in Jeddah, 
and on the ground Tariq al-Fadhli emerged as the leader of this group of Afghan 
veterans.144  
 However, this jihad to remove the socialist regime in southern Yemen would be 
short-lived, as was explained in an earlier section, eventually both the PDRY and the 
YAR unified. Although this unification physically brought two nations together, the unity 
was far from perfect. Many of the YSP leaders retained important seats in the new 	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government and the fight that the IJY had launched was deemed unfinished. In late 1992, 
the IJY was accused of organizing bombing in Aden, which had occurred in 
December.145 The IJY continued its violent strategy against Marxist officials in the 
government, and by the elections in 1993, more than 150 Politburo officials were dead.146  
 At this point, Yemen descended into a civil war, which was covered in an earlier 
section. Members of the IJY joined the fight on the side of the northern forces, and took 
over Aden on July 4th, sending southern leaders fleeing into neighboring countries, three 
days after this takeover, the civil war officially ended.147 With this involvement in the 
conflict, the IJY had shown that they were a force to be reckoned with, and had 
effectively, established a jihadi movement in Yemen. However, the defeat of the 
socialists in the civil war did not achieve enough to meet the expectations the jihadis in 
Yemen had. Bin Laden and the other jihadis had the expectation that the fall of the 
socialist regime in Yemen would be a harbinger of the fall of other secular regimes in the 
Middle East. Bin Laden himself captured this sentiment when he wrote; “The defeat of 
the communists is a rejection of atheist regimes across the region.”148 Nonetheless, the 
wish that bin Laden and the other jihadis had did not come true, in fact, in the aftermath 
of the civil war, the Socialist Party returned to the Yemeni parliament and continues to 
remain a major fixture in the country’s politics at present.149  
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 The end of the civil war brought an end to the IJY as a semi-organized jihadi 
movement, two of the major leaders of the group, al-Fadli and Jamal al-Nahdi, were 
appointed to government positions in exchange for disbanding the IJY.150 This move was 
not well received by many in the group, both local and foreign Islamists, unhappy 
southerners and northern tribesmen set about administering Islamic government in parts 
of southern Yemen.151 At this point, the Yemeni government was negotiating with IJY 
members as to what would happen after the group’s disbanding, however negotiations 
broke down over demands for military employment and the imposing of shari’a law in 
Aden.152 In response to the breakdown in negotiations, the IJY seized a security outpost 
in Aden’s Crater City in July of 1994, however this uprising was put down quickly.153 
This uprising and the response of the Yemeni government was the beginning of the end 
of the IJY, by the end of July twelve members of the IJY were reportedly dead, the rest 
were either arrested or hiding in Abyan and other governorates east of Sana’a.154 Many of 
the former IJY members who were hiding in Abyan would coalesce around a new group 
of jihad that was formed by another veteran of the Afghan war, the Army of Aden Abyan 
(AAA).155 
Army of Aden Abyan (AAA) 
 After putting down the uprising at Crater City, the national government deported 
thousands of foreign Arab Afghans in 1995 and 1996, and offered many of the former 
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IJY members civilian posts in the government, however many resisted.156 Among them 
was Zain al-Abidin Abubakr al-Midhar, who was a veteran of the Afghan war, and 
quickly emerged as a spokesman for what remained of the IJY. Although it is unclear 
when al-Mihdar created the AAA, it is believed that at sometime in 1994 he relocated to 
the Abyan governorate to rebuild the IJY.157 In 1995, with the help of Abu Hamza al-
Masri, al-Midhar established a training camp in Abyan, filling the camp with 
disenfranchised southerners, former IJY members and unaffiliated Arab Afghans.158 At 
the same time Abu Hamza reportedly set up funding for the newly formed AAA from 
London through his Finsbury Park Mosque.159  
 In March of 1998, the AAA established a training camp near the capital of the 
Abyan governorate, Zinjibar, in a move that angered irritated local farmers who notified 
the authorities.160 A month later the government in Sana’a launched an assault on the 
base, the raid failed, and resulted in the release of the first public statement by the AAA, 
soon after this statement a second statement was released, sent directly to the Agence 
France-Presse, calling for ‘total war’ against U.S. interests in Yemen and pledging the 
AAA’s support for Osama bin Laden.161 Before continuing with the explorations of the 
evolution of jihadi groups in Yemen, it would be helpful to take a step back and see what 
was occurring at this time. With the statement cited above, the AAA had given Islamic 
extremism in Yemen a global dimension. Whereas the IJY had kept its jihad local, and 
firmly rooted in the desire to change the government within Yemen into an Islamic one, 
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the AAA had turned its attention to the United States. With the ever-growing clout and 
support of bin Laden, this dynamic would only grow.  
 During this period there was a weak stalemate between the Yemeni government 
and the AAA. During this stalemate, there were ongoing negotiations between al-Midhar 
and the national government, however by December 1998, those talks had broken 
down.162 Even a ceasefire that was brokered by a representative of bin Laden himself 
could not hold up because of the continued clashes between government troops and AAA 
fighters.163 The AAA, had, by this time tapped into the growing resentment of the 
populace against the national government, which was failing to provide them with basic 
services. This issue was brought to the forefront when the government rejected the 
demands put forth by al-Midhar to increase basic social services. This inability of the 
national government to provide basic services to parts of the population is something that 
is present even today; one of the major reasons for the continuing conflict in Yemen is 
that there exists a large part of the population that remains disenfranchised. 
 The Yemeni government continued battling with the AAA into January of 1999, 
by this time many of fighters of the AAA had been arrested and charged with plotting to 
attack Western hotels in Yemen. Among those arrested were six male Britons linked to 
Abu Hamza and his Finsbury Park Mosque, these arrests showed the international reach 
of the AAA.164 These arrests and other raids spelled the end of the AAA as an organized 
group; eventually al-Midhar was arrested, tried and executed by a firing squad in 
Sana’a.165 However, the end of the AAA did not mean the end of violent jihad within 
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Yemen, in fact the work that the AAA had done was a boon to the future of jihad in 
Yemen. It should be remembered that at this point, globally, Islamic terrorism was on the 
rise, in 1998, U.S. embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania had been bombed. Both 
bombings were linked to Osama bin Laden and his newly formed al-Qa’ida organization. 
Bin Laden had established himself as a major financier of violent jihad to the point that 
by the spring of 1998, the Clinton administration had approved a plan to capture him.166 
 As mentioned above, the AAA had done what neither the IJY nor any other jihadi 
group in Yemen had done before. The Army of Aden Abyan had connected local 
grievances to a broader discourse of Western expansion into Muslim lands, and the 
resulting humiliation of Muslims, with this the AAA had provided the clearest of 
templates for future al-Qa’ida affiliated groups in Yemen, including AQAP.167 This idea 
of an international jihad is one that formed a core part of the overall operational plans of 
al-Qa’ida and its branches. Furthermore, both the AAA and al-Qa’ida strengthened this 
narrative through the citing of several hadiths168 demanding the expulsion of polytheism 
from the Arabian Peninsula.169 All of this combined to prove a foundation on which al-
Qa’ida could come into and start operations. This foundation that al-Qa’ida would step in 
and take advantage of was laid on the basis of government inaction and inability to 
provide for the diverse set of interests within the nation. This set of diverse interests, 
ranging from the interests of the southern and northern tribal leaders, to those of the 
various political parties vying for power, the interests of average citizens of Yemen and 	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the various interests of the international parties involved, will all have to be taken into 
account for Yemen to move forward. If these interests are not taken into account moving 
forward and the needs of the various groups not met, then groups like AQAP will be able 
to feed off the anger and the disenfranchisement of groups to gain support for their 
activities.  
 Even though the Army of Aden Abyan had furthered the mission of the IJY and 
had successfully connected local grievances to a global jihad against the West, it had 
failed as successful movement.170 The AAA had failed to launch a single attack against 
major Yemeni or western targets and the legacy of its leader, Zain al-Abidin al Midhar 
was one of ambition and charisma rather than any tangible accomplishment. However, 
because of what the AAA had done, al-Qa’ida could now establish itself in the troubled 
nation. With the fervent ideology of the AAA and the operational ability that the leaders 
of al-Qa’ida brought to the table, al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) would be able to 
accomplish what no other jihadi group in Yemen had been able to do. The age of Islamic 
terror was spreading into Yemen and very soon it would put the country on the radar of a 
global superpower.  
Al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) 
 For much of the mid-1990s, Yemen seemed a secondary priority for al-Qa’ida, as 
bin Laden was focusing his energy on consolidating control in Afghanistan through the 
Taliban and establishing a media presence abroad.171 The focus shifted to Yemen when 
another veteran of jihad in central Asia, Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammad Abdhah al-
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Nashiri, reportedly approached Bin Laden with a proposal for an attack on U.S. forces.172 
At this point it would be useful to explore the background of al-Nashiri a little bit, to 
show the widespread nature of Islamic fundamentalism and to also show how Yemen 
became a place that was attracting jihadis from the world over.  
From 1992 to 1993, al-Nashiri fought in Tajikistan as part of the jihad that was happening 
during the civil war in the country, this is where he first made contact with an al-Qa’ida 
operative, Walid Muhammad Salih bin Attash, and moved to train at an al-Qa’ida camp 
in Afghanistan.173 Al-Nashiri first met Bin Laden in 1994 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and 
it was during this meeting that al-Nashiri heard Bin Laden talk about the coming battle 
with the U.S. after this meeting, al-Nashiri eventually returned to Saudi Arabia, and then 
traveled to Yemen.174 In 1995, al-Nashiri attempted and failed to get into Tajikistan to 
continue fighting the jihad there, he then traveled to southern Afghanistan and stayed 
there involving himself with various Islamic fundamentalists.175 In 1996, al-Nashiri again 
met bin Laden and heard his message to wage jihad against the United States, it was at 
this time al-Nashiri was urged to pledge loyalty to bin Laden and his cause, however, al-
Nashiri refused finding swearing a loyalty oath to bin Laden distasteful.176 
After leaving Afghanistan, al-Nashiri visited Saudi Arabia and Yemen later in 
1996; this is where the idea for his first terrorist operation began to take shape as he saw 
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many U.S. and foreign vessels sailing off the coast of Yemen.177 After this, al-Nashiri 
decided to return to Afghanistan in 1997 and joined the Taliban in their fight against the 
Ahmed Shah Massoud led Northern Alliance, he also found that bin Laden was still in 
Afghanistan recruiting for his global jihad against the U.S. and in 1998, after learning 
that his cousin was the bomber in the U.S. Embassy attacks in Kenya, al-Nashiri formally 
joined al-Qa’ida.178 
 By this time, al-Nashiri was fully committed to the jihad that bin Laden was 
espousing, and upon joining al-Qa’ida, he went to train in a variety of weapons, 
sometime in 1998, al-Nashiri met with bin Laden to discuss the idea of attacking a 
western vessel off the coast of Yemen.179 In late spring of 1999, bin Laden provided al-
Nashiri with $2,000 to return to Yemen, purchase a boat and observe the travel of U.S. 
Navy ships and oil tankers, however al-Nashiri did not see any U.S. naval vessels during 
his observation.180 At this point, bin Laden instructed al-Nashiri to case activity in the 
Port of Aden, located off the coast of Aden, after a few months of casing, and a failed 
attack on USS The Sullivans, al-Qa’ida struck the USS Cole in October of 2000.  
 This attack on an important U.S. target was a major feat for al-Qa’ida. The attack 
also showed the religious fervor that bin Laden put on the fight against the United States, 
after the attack he reportedly remarked, “The destroyer represented the capital of the 
West, and the small boat represented Mohammed.”181 The attack also showed the 
importance that bin Laden had placed on Yemen. In late 1996, bin Laden had given an 	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interview to the London newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi, in which he stated that the second 
base of al-Qa’ida, if established would only be done in Yemen.182 He stated, “The choice 
is between Afghanistan and Yemen. Yemen’s topography is mountainous, and its people 
are tribal, armed, and allow one to breathe clear air unblemished with humiliation.”183 In 
this interview, bin Laden hit on some key points that make Yemen a fertile ground for 
groups like al-Qa’ida to grow and hold territory. Both the geography and the tribal 
makeup of Yemeni society was something that a group like al-Qa’ida could take 
advantage of very easily, combined with the mountainous geography built for hiding and 
easily escaping government forces made the environment quite hospitable for al-Qa’ida.  
 The USS Cole bombing allowed al-Qa’ida to establish itself in Yemen, mostly 
because of one man, Qa’id Salim Talib Sinyan al-Harithi who came from the upper 
Shabwah region in Yemen. Qa’id Salim al-Harithi, had, just like al-Nashiri, participated 
in jihad in Afghanistan; it was during his participation in the Soviet-Afghan War that he 
first met bin Laden.184 With bin Laden’s assistance, al-Harithi helped establish training 
camps in multiple provinces in Yemen in the early 1990s to fight against the Yemen 
Socialist Party.185 After a few years of travelling to various jihadi hotspots and getting 
arrested in the UAE, al-Harithi returned to Afghanistan in 1997 and received instructions 
from bin Laden to start preparing for attacks in Yemen.186 In 2000, al-Harithi returned to 
Yemen and by the fall of 2001, Washington identified al-Harithi as the most senior al-
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Qa’ida commander in Yemen.187 The involvement of both al-Nashiri and al-Harithi in the 
USS Cole bombing showed the global and local reach of al-Qa’ida. Both men had 
participated in the Afghan jihad, one came from Saudi Arabia and the other was a 
Yemeni, yet the network that bin Laden had laid through the establishment of al-Qa’ida 
allowed both men to connect and launch a major attack within Yemen. This ability that 
al-Qa’ida possessed would go a long way in laying the foundation on which a group like 
AQAP could be established.  
 However, despite the concerns of the United States, especially after the attacks on 
9/11, al-Qa’ida in Yemen did not mount any serious efforts to exploit the Cole bombing, 
no follow-up attacks or propaganda efforts were mounted by the group.188 The only major 
operation that occurred was in October of 2002, when members of AQY bombed the 
French tanker M/V Limburg, but this attack was by no means a tactical success like the 
attack on the Cole two years earlier. By this point, Yemen had fallen off the radar of 
counter-terrorism experts and policymakers, with the U.S. and most of the world busy 
with the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ that centered in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The national 
government of Yemen, led by Saleh, had pledged support for the U.S. led war against 
Islamic extremism and the U.S. was content in letting Yemeni authorities lead the way in 
Yemen, with light U.S. support. This support was seen in 2002 when a U.S. drone strike 
killed al-Harithi in the southern Marib region.189 
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 Killings like al-Harithi’s and arrests of members by government forces led to the 
demise of AQY. This group, although, it had officially unfurled the banner of al-Qa’ida 
in Yemen had not done anything to establish a lasting organization committed to global 
jihad in Yemen. By no means was the establishment of al-Qa’ida in Yemen anything like 
the group enjoyed in pre-9/11 Afghanistan or even as to what the group was establishing 
in Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks. Although AQY had carried out two attacks against 
Western targets, the group had failed to establish durable ties within the country and 
failed to create a common vision or ideology.190 It would take nearly three years for 
another like-minded group to rise up in Yemen, however the new group was very 
dissimilar with AQY. The al-Qa’ida of al-Nashiri and al-Harithi was at best a network of 
foreign leaders abroad and local operatives at home who were loosely organized around 
secretive plots.191 This was a far cry from the permanent or institutionalized terrorist 
organization that al-Qa’ida had become in other parts of the world.  
 Nonetheless all of this would change in a few years. As the U.S. and the rest of 
the world focused on al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and later the U.S. led War in 
Iraq, al-Qa’ida would re-emerge in Yemen, taking advantage of weak government control 
combined with a populace filled with resentments towards the government, and the lack 
of attention from Western powers. The al-Qa’ida branch that would emerge in Yemen in 
2006 would establish the first durable al-Qa’ida presence in the country and would force 
the world to turn its attention once more to the Arabian Peninsula.  
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Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
 AQAP’s first pivotal moment in Yemen would come on the morning of February 
3, 2006 when nearly twenty-four men would escape through a tunnel running from the 
basement of Sana’a’s Political Security Organization’s prison to a mosque in the 
capital.192 Seven months later, a group calling itself al-Qa’ida in the Land of the 
Yemen193 carried out synchronized suicide attacks against Western oil facilities in the 
Marib and Hadramawt governorates.194 The leaders of these attacks were mostly 
comprised of prisoners who had escaped on February third. Two of the nine attackers, 
Nasir al-Wahayshi195 and Qasim al-Raymi196, would climb to become part of the upper 
echelon within AQAP.197 The complexity of the attack showed how AQAP was moving 
away from the earlier tactics of the IJY and the AAA. This attack was followed by the 
assassination of a local police chief in April; three months later the group mounted a 
second suicide operation, which killed eight Spanish tourists in the Marib governorate.198 
These attacks quickly proved that AQAP was not another group that was simply going 
appear and vanish quickly; instead, the group would soon show itself to be the most 
resilient and ambitious jihadi organization in Yemen.  
 The root of the resiliency of AQAP lies in the group’s ability to have local 
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strategy AQAP is able to hit both U.S. interests, therefore weaken counter-terrorism 
efforts, and isolate the national government in Sana’a. This, in turn, pushes the already 
autonomous local population to further recede and disconnect from the national 
government and international actors. Furthermore, even though the attacks on tourists, oil 
infrastructure, and other Western interests go to AQAP’s interest to bloody the United 
States and the West, the main purpose of the attacks remains local.199 One of those goals 
was mentioned above, the attacks isolate the government in Sana’a, the other goal served 
is that the attacks communicate the group’s relevance to jihadis elsewhere.200 Further 
study of the advantages AQAP accrued from these attacks yields answers to important 
questions such as how AQAP is able to enmesh itself so deeply within the rural areas in 
Yemen, to the point the group actually controls territory. This study and understanding is 
important in the long run because it gives policymakers the ability to understand the core 
of AQAP resiliency and formulate an adequate response. Furthermore, this analysis will 
be revisited in a later section, when the crisis in Yemen is analyzed through systems 
theory. Unfortunately, AQAP has become part of the ‘system’ that is Yemen and to 
resolve or manage the crisis within the system, important parts of the system must be 
understood.  
 The attacks that AQAP carried out against oil facilities and westerners made it so 
economic pressure was being imposed on an already besieged national government, this 
in turn, starved the government of much needed foreign investment.201 The attacks 
offered more advantages to AQAP, they clearly damaged western interests physically, 
exacting a toll of lives and material, but they also forced western nations to impose travel 	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restrictions on their citizens and embassy staff.202 These restrictions made it so the U.S. 
was severely constrained in its visibility to developments outside Sana’a, and the people 
outside Sana’a were also constrained in the interaction with U.S. diplomats.203 Because of 
these constraints the communications battle was effectively ceded to AQAP, allowing the 
group to spread its message without any competing messages from the West coming 
in.204 Without the ability to present a competing message, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts 
were handicapped, and AQAP was able to not only spread its message but also paint the 
U.S. as the intruding ‘infidel’ in a Muslim land. Essentially, AQAP was given freedom to 
expand its influence within Yemen, expand its targets to the Saudi government, and have 
the ability to carry out operations abroad as well.205 
 Initially, AQAP was somewhat conciliatory towards the Saleh government, 
asking President Saleh to renounce secularism in the group’s first official release on 13 
October 2006, it was only after President Saleh failed to do either of things requested did 
AQAP’s tone become more violent.206 This further allowed AQAP to legitimize itself in 
the eyes of the local population, Saleh not heeding to call to break ties with the West 
allowed AQAP to project and take advantage of the ‘we asked, but he didn’t listen’ 
dynamic and then proceed to call for violence. During this time period, AQAP also 
consolidated its media outreach, creating and strengthening its media wing al-Malahim.  
 By 2007, AQAP had worked to position itself as the foremost legitimate means 
for expressing discontent with the political status quo.207 This positioning was a key part 
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of the AQAP strategy, this positioning allowed AQAP to strengthen itself amongst the 
local populace, and it also increased the group’s global appeal. This phenomenon of 
integrating itself within a population is not unique to AQAP in Yemen. The Taliban have 
used this strategy in areas that they control in Afghanistan. The scholar, David Kilcullen, 
in his book, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, labels this 
strategy the theory of competitive control. Formally expressed, the theory is that: in 
irregular conflicts (conflicts where at least one combatant is a non-state armed group), the 
local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, 
consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that 
population and its residential area.208 This theory is not only informative in seeing how 
AQAP is able to retain control in vast swaths of Yemen, but can also be used to explain 
the control that the Houthis exercise in Yemen. Furthermore, as will be detailed later, the 
systems theory based approach of the SAT model can be applied in a system where a 
non-state armed group exercises competitive control in a way that cuts away that control.  
Globally, at this point the main branch of al-Qa’ida, known as al-Qa’ida central, 
was losing power and appeal. Bin Laden and his second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri 
had all but vanished from the global scene, the joint efforts of the United States and 
NATO forces were yielding results in Afghanistan and had al-Qa’ida on the run. The 
group found itself dispersed and overstretched; the Global War on Terror had truly 
become global with more and more countries becoming vigilant to the militant threat. 
However, in Yemen al-Qa’ida had found a fertile place for development and was, by 
2007, well on its way to establishing what would, in two years time, become AQAP.  	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 AQAP not only worked to be the main method of voicing political discontent, but 
also vigorously defended this role. To date, AQAP continues to display an impressive 
talent for assimilating broadly popular grievances into a single narrative in which jihad 
remains the only solution to the country’s multiple crises.209 AQAP worked to exploit 
popular sentiment against the national government. By 2010, AQAP’s al-Malahim wing 
had developed a magazine to spread the group’s message further. The assimilation of the 
Yemeni population’s grievances can be seen in the very first issue of the magazine, 
known as Inspire. In a letter apparently written by Ayman al-Zawahiri, he calls his 
readers to jihad by asking,  
“How, O noble and defiant tribes of Yemen, can you agree to 
let Yemen be a supply center for the Crusade against the 
Muslim countries? How can you agree to let the ruling 
authority in Yemen to be the CIA? How can you accept this 
treasonous traitor as your president and ruler, when he begs 
the pleasure of the Americans and their dollars by spilling the 
blood of the free, noble and honest men of Yemen?”210 
 
In this early issue of the magazine, AQAP also showed the ability to understand Western 
interests and formulate its strategy around those interests. Another quote offers an 
example of such understanding, “Because of the greed of the Americans, they have vital 
interests in the Arabian Peninsula. The passage-ways of commerce pass through its 
waters and oil is stolen from it. So this place is a vein of life for the Americans.”211 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  Koehler-­‐Derrick,	  Gabriel,	  ed.	  A	  False	  Foundation?	  AQAP,	  Tribes	  and	  Ungoverned	  Spaces	  in	  Yemen.	  Rep.	  West	  Point,	  NY:	  Combating	  Terrorism	  Center,	  2011.	  Print.	  210	  Al-­‐Zawahiri,	  Ayman.	  "Message	  to	  the	  People	  of	  Yemen."	  Inspire.	  Al-­‐Qa’ida	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula,	  Sept.	  2010.	  Web.	  8	  July	  2015.	  <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-­‐inspire-­‐magazine-­‐volume-­‐1-­‐uncorrupted.pdf>.	  p.	  11	  211	  Al-­‐Malahim	  staff.	  "Interview	  with	  Shaykh	  Abu	  Basir:	  The	  head	  of	  al-­‐Qa’idah	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula."	  Inspire.	  Al-­‐Qa’ida	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula,	  Sept.	  2010.	  Web.	  8	  July	  2015.	  	  <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-­‐inspire-­‐magazine-­‐volume-­‐1-­‐uncorrupted.pdf>.	  p.	  14	  
	   62	  
quote shows how AQAP fully understands that attacking vital U.S. interests in the region 
could cause major damage.  
 By arguing against both the West and the national government in Yemen, and 
showing how the West’s influence has corrupted the government, AQAP shows how the 
government has forfeited its ability to rule effectively. By incorporating local grievances 
against the government, AQAP paints it as a regime that neither represents the interests 
of the people nor adheres to Islam.212 Through this line of argument, AQAP taps into the 
understanding of al wala wa al-bara (association and dissociation)213, where al-wala 
mandates that Muslims support those that resist secular governments, al-Qa’ida argues 
that al-bara demands that Yemenis withdraw their support from the ‘apostate’ 
government in Sana’a.214 AQAP goes further to argue that the formation of a legitimate 
government cannot lie in the bankrupt ideologies of the West, and media releases by 
AQAP often support that argument by pointing to Yemen’s failed experiments with 
secularism and democracy.215 This leaves AQAP to argue that the only possible route left 
for governance in Yemen is to follow Islamic law, or shari’a. Through the effective use 
of this communication strategy, AQAP has positioned itself as an organization that is a 
reflection of the local population and the global community of subjugated Muslims.216 
 Furthermore, since its founding in 2009, alongside the communications strategy 
outlined above, AQAP has executed a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, through which it has 	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won the loyalty of many of the local tribes in Yemen.217 As was mentioned above, AQAP 
has a deep understanding of local grievances, however alongside this, AQAP also has the 
ability to address those grievances for the local population. This move from 
understanding to action is key for the resiliency of a group like AQAP, since the group 
was, initially, mainly a collection of Arabs coming in from outside of Yemen. Given the 
autonomous nature of the local tribes in the country, the coming of AQAP would be seen 
as an outsider interfering and would thus be treated with hostility. However, by 
addressing many of the grievances local tribes face, AQAP not only earns loyalty but also 
ingratiates itself within the tribes. A report by the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, the author explains how AQAP accomplishes this. By capitalizing on 
longstanding local grievances relating to inadequate education, healthcare, security, rule 
of law, political representation, and economic development, AQAP replicates the national 
government’s functions throughout the region.218 The group sends out political agents to 
establish a form of stability based on shari’a law, by convening regular meetings with 
community leaders, solving local problems, and resolving tribal feuds through a 
religiously inspired justice system.219  
 Alongside the mitigation of conflicts, AQAP also lends protection to the weaker 
tribes from stronger rivals, and creates social opportunity for members of weaker tribes to 
rise beyond their social positions, effectively doing exactly what government social 
programs are set up to do. The result of these efforts has been a boon for al-Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula, the efforts appeal to the local population, not only because they are 	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better than what the government provides but also because many of the tribal sheikhs 
have been discredited for not living up to their responsibilities.220 In these situations, 
AQAP nets two victories, one against the national government, because it further 
alienates the population from Sana’a and the other against the tribal sheikhs, this victory 
cements the loyalty of the local populace to AQAP.  
 This strategy of gathering loyalty works in supplement with another strategy 
AQAP often applies, and that is to seek out areas where government control is absent and 
local tribal leaders are apathetic or weak.221 This remains AQAP’s greatest strength, the 
local tribes are too weak to face the group on their own and unless given a reason, they 
do not attempt to.222 This strategy combines with the ability of AQAP to address local 
grievances effectively, and makes it so the local population becomes loyal to the group. 
By doing all of this, AQAP has lost its initial foreign character, and has blended into the 
population, to the point that it is next to impossible for Western counter-terrorism forces 
to differentiate AQAP members from the local population.223 The end result of all of 
these efforts by AQAP is the protection the group earns from military strikes by the 
national government and Western forces. This has made counter-terrorism operations 
quite difficult; in fact, this ability of AQAP to blend into the population has made it so 
that the use of drone strikes has become a strategic liability. Some analysts argue that 
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these strikes engender anti-Americanism, increase alienation from the national 
government, and increase sympathy towards AQAP.224  
 Overall, AQAP and its ability to become part of the ‘system’ presents a very 
complex obstacle on the path to resolving the current crisis engulfing Yemen. In the next 
chapter and sections, there will be a detailed analysis of how the United States has 
responded to the threat posed by AQAP. There will also be an analysis of the current 
conflict in Yemen, how it came to be and where it stands. Thus far, most of the U.S. 
efforts against AQAP have been limited to counterterrorism operations, and as effective 
as those operations are in taking away individual leaders within AQAP, they have failed 
to address the fundamental issues that create the support Yemenis give to AQAP.225 What 
this chapter has sought to do is give an understanding of how Islamic militancy operates 
in Yemen. Through this analysis, one can see an important, however unfortunate, part of 
the system that is Yemen function. The understanding of this functioning is important in 
formulating potential methods of resolution to the crisis in Yemen and in protecting U.S. 
interests in the region. As we move forward and the various entities operating in Yemen 
become clearer, AQAP and its workings should be kept in mind.   
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AQAP Territorial Control 
 
CHAPTER VI 
U.S. INVOLVEMENT AND POLITICAL UNREST 
The “Global War on Terror” 
 As pointed out earlier, the involvement of the United States in Yemen stretches 
back to the late nineties and into the early millennium. The attack on the USS Cole and 
the growing influence of al-Qa’ida made Yemen somewhat of a priority. However, the 
attacks on 9/11 and the events following it made it so Yemen became just another front in 
the global war that was being waged mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and later Iraq. 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President Saleh visited the United States; in a meeting with 
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President Bush he pledged assistance in the emerging war against al-Qa’ida.226 In return, 
Saleh received U.S. assurances that there would be continued economic and military 
support for Yemen.227  
Along with these assurances, Saleh also received the reduced pressure on matters 
of democratization from the U.S. Until the attacks on 9/11 Yemen had been lackluster in 
its counter-terrorism policies, more willing to appease extremists instead of directly 
confronting them. After 9/11, however, all of this changed for several reasons. First, U.S. 
officials were aware that a number of the hijackers had been born in Yemen, showing the 
dramatic effects of laissez-faire counter-terrorism policies, second, Saleh remembered the 
terrible consequences to Yemen when it failed to side with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf 
War in 1991, and finally, Saleh realized the advantages he would gain for his 
authoritarian rule by supporting the U.S.228 All three of these reasons converged to make 
the Yemeni government publicly back Washington in its global war against al-Qa’ida.  
 However, this backing essentially gave the United States a carte blanche to take 
on al-Qa’ida targets within Yemen. The U.S. therefore entered the Yemeni battlefield 
with the understanding that al-Qa’ida in Yemen was quite similar to al-Qa’ida in other 
locations; however, this would soon be proven false. In 2002, the U.S. began to use 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones as part of combat operations in the global 
war against al-Qa’ida. One of the countries where clandestine drone operations started 
taking place was Yemen. Unfortunately, the strategy that the U.S. was using to fight 
AQAP was based on what had worked in areas such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, two 
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other countries in which UAVs had become part of combat operations. In both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, drone strikes were destroying what is often termed al-Qa’ida’s 
core.229 However, unlike in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qa’ida was largely a 
group of Arabs in non-Arab nations, in Yemen, al-Qa’ida membership consists of 
Yemenis.230 This fact in Yemen creates multiple policy implications for the U.S. One of 
which is because al-Qa’ida in Yemen is localized, members do not have to go outside of 
the country to gather the expertise to carry out operations.231 This means that because 
these individuals are not crossing international borders, they are harder to detect and 
apprehend.  
 Another implication is that the current U.S. strategy of drone strikes means the 
machines are targeting the local population.232 Something that was not true in either 
Afghanistan or Pakistan, where al-Qa’ida members were apart from the local populations. 
As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, al-Qa’ida in Yemen has become part of the local 
population to the point that it is quite difficult to separate an al-Qa’ida member from a 
local. It is even harder when viewing a target from thousands of feet in the air, as drone 
pilots routinely do, and most of the time both the local tribesman and the al-Qa’ida 
member are one in the same. This makes it so the U.S. strategy runs up against an 
embedded Yemeni concept233 called thar.234 The concept of thar means that for every 
individual that the United States identifies as a terrorist and kills, the family members 
and/or relatives of that individual rise up to fight against the United States and defend 	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that person as a tribesman. Therefore, the U.S. in pursuing a ‘drone-heavy’ strategy in 
Yemen is creating more enemies than it is destroying. In fact, many of these men are 
drawn to al-Qa’ida not because they agree with the group’s ideology per se, but because 
they see the group as a means to get revenge on the killers of their kin.  
 Some of the drone strikes on al-Qa’ida in Yemen have been successful, such as 
the one in September 2011 that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen who, the U.S. 
government believed to be the head of AQAP’s external operations unit, or the strike in 
2014 that killed Said al-Shihri, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee and the deputy 
commander of AQAP.235 As mentioned before, this year a U.S. drone also took out Nasir 
al-Wahayshi, the founder of AQAP and former head of the group. Although these strikes 
have damaged the group, they prove ineffectual in completely dismantling the al-Qa’ida 
threat in Yemen. In fact, soon after the U.S. drone strike took out al-Wahayshi, Qasim al-
Raymi was promoted to be the head of AQAP and he proceeded to release a video calling 
for renewed attacks against the United States.236 This is the result of the ‘whack-a-mole’ 
strategy that the United States is applying in Yemen; the broader AQAP network does not 
get dismantled effectively, while new leaders keep popping up. Furthermore, as pointed 
out above this strategy further alienates a population already fed up by foreign 
intervention; this alienation can only result in further enmity towards the West.  
 One of the main reasons as to why the United States continues to use drones in 
Yemen is because policymakers understand that sending troops into the country would be 
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a catastrophic mistake.237 However, this does not take away the fact that the drone strikes 
are greatly damaging long term U.S. policy in the nation, and creating a whole population 
who only associates the United States with missiles launched from these drones. An 
article in Foreign Policy magazine pointed this out, citing the December 12, 2013 drone 
strike in Yemen that killed civilians going to a wedding party, “It’s going to take more 
than drone strikes to eliminate al Qaeda from its strongholds in this Yemeni province. 
The militants killed, locals say, are replaceable, while the tens of civilians killed over the 
past two years has only heightened distrust of the central government among 
noncombatants, pushing some young men into al Qaeda’s arms.”238  In this section we 
will explore the adverse affects that the drone strategy has had on the long-term strategic 
goals of the U.S. in Yemen. Through this exploration we will see the problem that exists 
within the current U.S. policy, and a potential to rethink this policy.  
Rise of Drone Warfare 
 Following the 9/11 attacks the U.S. established a targeted killing program, which 
has expanded into battlefields beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2002, as was noted 
above, the U.S. has conducted secret targeted killings in Yemen through drone strikes as 
well as conventional strikes.239 The U.S. claims authority under domestic and 
international law to conduct targeted killings against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and their 
“associated forces.”240 Within domestic law, the U.S. claims authority under the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, which authorizes the president “to use all 	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necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States...”241 The United States 
claims authority to conduct targeted killings under international law on two grounds. First 
it claims it is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and “associated 
forces”, second, the U.S. claims this authority through the right to national self-
defense.242 
 President Obama, at a recent speech he gave at National Defense University 
(NDU) outlined the use of targeted killings, in a Presidential Policy Guidance that the 
president signed a day before his NDU speech, there were details given on the 
preconditions of the targeted killings program.243 The fact sheet states, that lethal force 
will be used outside areas of active hostilities only when the following preconditions are 
met: First, a legal basis must exist for using lethal force, second, the U.S. will only use 
lethal force against a target that poses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.244 
Finally, the following criteria must be met before lethal action may be taken: 1) near 
certainty that the terrorist target is present; 2) near certainty that non-combatants will not 
be injured or killed; 3) an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the 
operation; 4) an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country 
where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. 
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persons; and 5) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively 
address the threat to U.S. persons.245  
However comprehensive this policy guidance might look, commentators have 
criticized it on many occasions. They have noted that the rules leave critical questions 
unanswered, such as the definition of “areas of active hostilities” because of this lack of 
clarity, it is unclear where the fact sheet’s policies apply, there is also a lack of clarity as 
to what actual patterns of behavior or ‘signatures’ are used to determine who is and is not 
considered a combatant.246 Just these criticisms show how problematic the U.S. drone 
strategy is, with both criticisms pointing to how the undefined nature of the strategy 
could lead to it expanding endlessly. Without the patterns of behavior clearly defined the 
use of drone strikes could also result in more civilian deaths. The key issue here is what 
actually defines an enemy combatant in this conflict. In Yemen, as it was pointed out 
above, al-Qa’ida has the ability to blend into society to the point that it is nearly 
impossible to separate locals from al-Qa’ida members, with this distinction not even 
existing many times. The policy directive of the U.S. states that the U.S. has the authority 
to wage war against people who are of imminent threat to the safety of U.S. persons or 
people who are members of al-Qa’ida. In Yemen, al-Qa’ida operates in a way that makes 
it so this sort of war becomes unending.  
 The ability of AQAP to assimilate within the societal structures within Yemen 
makes it so the membership of the group, as defined by the U.S., creates an ever-
expanding amount of targets. What makes it so a person in Yemen is a member of al-
Qa’ida? Does accepting money from the group or the group’s protection make one a 	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supporter of al-Qa’ida and therefore someone who is a threat to U.S. persons? 
Furthermore, does the support to al-Qa’ida by tribal elders or members of various tribes 
for various reasons make all of those people enemies of the United States and thus fit for 
drone strikes? The big concern that these questions point to is what the result of such 
targeted killings is on the overall U.S. policy in the region. The official statement is that 
the United States is engaged in a covert battle with one of the most active branches of al-
Qa’ida, and seeks to dismantle this branch and prevent it from using Yemen as a base to 
launch attacks globally. The question is whether the strategy being pursued accomplishes 
this policy or not? Recent news, however points in the opposite direction. Recently, 
Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, a high ranking member with AQAP has urged Muslims to carry 
out lone-wolf strikes in Western countries.247 The issue this news raises is that the 
military operations that the United States is involved in within Yemen are not bearing the 
results that policy makers have hoped for.  
 Furthermore, there is a large amount of evidence that this strategy of drone strikes 
is alienating the Yemeni population towards the United States. Many of these strikes end 
up killing civilians. These civilians are family members, who have lives and people who 
deeply care about them. An article written in the Washington Post, reported that the 
continued U.S. airstrikes are stirring increasing sympathy for al-Qa’ida linked militants 
and are driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United 
States.248 The article goes on to point out how the airstrikes are angering powerful tribes 
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within Yemen, tribes that will be key is any resolution to the current crisis, and could 
prevent al-Qa’ida from gaining strength in the country.249 Even one of the more 
successful strikes on a known AQAP target has resulted in unwanted consequences for 
the United States in Yemen. One of the most influential tribes in southern Yemen, a 
hotbed of al-Qa’ida activity, is the Awlak tribe250; this is the tribe that Anwar al-Awlaki, 
whose death from a U.S. drone strike has been mentioned above. His son, the sixteen-
year old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was killed in a drone strike a 
month following his father’s death, the Awlak tribesmen are known to be businessmen, 
lawmakers, and politicians, however, the strikes have pushed many of them to join the 
militants or to provide AQAP with safe haven in their areas.251 This shift of tribal 
loyalties shows, in a very stark manner, the failure of U.S. policy in the region. The 
United States maintains that the strategic interests in Yemen include the stability of the 
country, the protection of U.S. and/or western assets, and the eradication of the al-Qa’ida 
presence in the nation. However, with the actions that the United States policymakers 
have pursued on the ground have resulted in the increase of al-Qa’ida’s presence and the 
decrease in the amount of stability within the nation. Reports have indicated how the 
recent Saudi led intervention in Yemen, which had the quite backing of the United States, 
has strengthened al-Qa’ida.252 It has been a few months since the U.S. supported Saudi 
intervention in Yemen began, and fighters linked to AQAP are closing in on the key port 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-­‐yemen-­‐us-­‐air...-­‐sympathy-­‐for-­‐al-­‐qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html?hpid=z2>.	  249	  Ibid.	  	  250	  Ibid.	  251	  Ibid.	  252	  Youssef,	  Nancy	  A.	  "The	  U.S.-­‐Backed	  War	  in	  Yemen	  Is	  Strengthening	  Al	  Qaeda."	  The	  Daily	  Beast.	  The	  Daily	  Beast	  Company,	  25	  Aug.	  2015.	  Web.	  25	  Aug.	  2015.	  <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/25/the-­‐u-­‐s-­‐backed-­‐war-­‐in-­‐yemen-­‐is-­‐strengthening-­‐al-­‐qaeda.html>.	  
	   75	  
city of Aden, according to U.S. officials and local reports.253 Not only is the group 
gaining strength, it is also reported to be safer than before, by mixing in with the local 
populations, AQAP has become harder to target through the drone program.254 According 
to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, a Washington, D.C. based think tank, “AQAP has insinuated itself among 
multiple faction on the ground, making itself more difficult to attack.”255 
 Along with the rise of al-Qa’ida, recent reports have indicated another 
problematic dynamic arising in Yemen is the spread of the ISIL; this point was alluded to 
earlier. A recent article published by the Jamestown Foundation pointed out how the 
current conflict going on in Yemen has allowed for ISIL to enter the fray.256 ISIL 
officially entered the battlefield in Yemen in November as Wilayat al-Yemen, or 
“Province of Yemen”, and are seeking to drive the current conflict in the country in a 
more sectarian direction. 257 Although, the next section will explore more this rise of ISIL 
within Yemen, one point deserves attention in this section, that point is how ISIL’s 
presence and the strategies that the group will likely pursue in Yemen will further divide 
the country along sectarian lines and may pull the United States further into the Yemeni 
morass. The likely scenario, if ISIL expands in Yemen, is that the United States continues 
following the strategy it has adopted against AQAP, since it is highly unlikely that 
Washington would want to use any sort of sustained ground assault within Yemen to 
dislodge ISIL and/or AQAP from their strongholds. However, the continuation of the 	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current strategy will also increase the radicalization on the ground. This increased 
radicalization will allow for increased membership and support of groups like ISIL and 
AQAP. With what has been seen regarding the rapid rise of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq, 
the future of Yemen, if ISIL does establish itself will not look good.  
 The U.S. continues to maintain that the current strategy of using signature strikes 
is resulting in the advancement of national security interests, however, what this 
justification fails to recognize are the long-term results of pursuing this strategy. As the 
strikes increase, the amount of collateral damage increases, parallel to this increase is the 
increase in the radicalization of the population. This radicalization increases anti-
American sentiment within the Yemeni population and results in further detriment to U.S. 
policy goals in the region. The current state of affairs in Yemen shows how strong the 
anti-American sentiment is. A recent article by Stratfor pointed to the benefits that al-
Qa’ida has accrued from the recent crisis. The article states, “The group has actively 
fought Houthi rebels—mostly with vehicle-borne IED258 attacks and armed assaults on 
Houthi positions—in conjunction with its tribal allies...the group’s successes have not 
been without costs, though—in particular, drone strikes have targeted al-Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula leaders...”259 The article goes on to state that even with the strikes, the 
group finds itself “comfortably nested” in Yemen and will become yet another serious 
problem for a central government.260 One way to understand the unintended and 
detrimental consequences of U.S. foreign policy in the region is to look at the state of 	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current affairs in Yemen. To do this the next section will analyze the current political 
instability and conflict that the nation of Yemen is facing. This will give an 
understanding of the current status of the ‘system’ within Yemen, this understanding, in 
turn, will yield in a better ability to apply the systems theory to be discussed in a later 
chapter.  
Revolution in Yemen and Aftermath 
 Before the discussion of what occurred in Yemen after the revolution in 2011, it 
would be good to give some context. Before 2011, the population of Yemen faced a dual 
set of problems, one group of problems was socio-political and the other group of 
problems was socio-economic.261 The socio-economic issues ranged from high levels of 
unemployment and poverty combined with the misallocation and problematic distribution 
of resources, such as water, all of which contributed to social suffering and a great 
amount of frustration and anger amongst the population.262 The socio-political issues 
were, and are complex, mostly because of the nation’s social makeup.263 The overlapping 
and conflicting loyalties (to the tribe, the clan, or the state) of the population combined 
with the lack of transparency and accountability in the government, and the large amount 
of corruption, created a volatile mix.264 On top of these socio-political issues lay the lack 
of modernization in the country, modernization that is necessary for the creation of a 
modern and democratic society, this lack of modernization created an increased military 
and tribal presence in the nation.265 
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 Both the socio-economic and the socio-political problems present in Yemen in 
2011 created a mix of anger and frustration towards the national government within the 
national population. This anger boiled over when Yemenis saw what was happening in 
the rest of the region in this time period. The question of ‘why not us?’ came to the 
forefront and the population decided to take on the regime directly and call for change 
within the nation.  
The Arab Spring in Yemen 
 In 2011, the Middle East went through a period of dramatic change, from nations 
in northern Africa to Bahrain, the region saw organic, grassroots uprisings that caused a 
major shift in how these nations were governed. These revolutions were collectively 
labeled the ‘Arab Spring’ and were unprecedented in the region; the age-old autocracies 
that had kept a tight lid on the aspirations of their citizens in the name of stability were 
removed. Although there were quite a few commonalities in the various uprisings that 
occurred in the Middle East at this time, there were key differences present also.  
A case analysis of the Yemeni revolution by the Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies at the Doha Institute discussed a key difference. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, 
where the events that led to the revolution and the fall of the rule were spontaneous, and 
where the protesters’ demands were social at the beginning, the revolution in Yemen was 
motivated by political factors.266 The report goes on to note that Yemeni opposition 
parties, even before the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia had started, had already expressed 
strong disapproval over President Saleh’s planned political reforms.267 The protests began 
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on these lines gaining more weight and popularity as time went on, especially after 
important elements of the political and military elite joined in. 
 As the protests gained steam, with multiple large protests occurring, the specter 
of violence arose. On March 11, 2011 there was a protest calling for the ouster of 
President Saleh in which three people were killed, these protests were followed up by 
other mass demonstrations in which violence continued.268 On March 18th, about fifty-
two protesters were shot dead and more than two hundred and fifty were injured in 
Sana’a when pro-government snipers fired at them from rooftops.269 At this point, the 
Saleh government saw many defections including many of main military leaders, who 
declared there support for the protesters.270 As the Revolution progressed, Saleh proposed 
an early presidential election before the end of 2011, he added the promise that neither he 
nor his son would run for office in this election.271 The back and forth between Saleh and 
the opposition continued as Saleh refused to step down and stated he considered the 
protests to be an attempted coup, he also warned of the growing threat of al-Qa’ida 
stating that Yemen could descend into a civil war if the protests continued.272 As the 
protests, and the resulting violence continued, President Saleh, coming under the 
mounting pressure, agreed to step down as part of a “constitutional transfer of power”, 
however, opposition leaders rejected the offer.273 As the protests continued and Saleh 
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refused to step down, the United States stepped in, publicly calling for Saleh to give up 
rule, stating that continued unrest could create a power vacuum that would be an 
advantage for al-Qa’ida in the region.274  
As the unrest continued, and Saleh continued to resist giving up power, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) stepped in to attempt a resolution for impasse, however 
those efforts did not bear fruit either, on April 30, 2011, officials close to Saleh stated 
that he had “reservations” about the GCC-brokered deal and would not sign it.275 As 
protests continued to spread the opposition held to their stance that the GCC brokered 
deal was the only deal they would accept from Saleh, as pressure and violence continued 
to mount, Saleh again promised elections and his willingness to sign the GCC deal.276 
However, on May 22, 2011 Saleh backed out of signing the GCC deal and several 
thousand gunmen hired by Saleh’s government besieged the United Arab Emirates’ 
embassy in Sana’a, where diplomats from the U.S., U.K., E.U., and the GCC were 
staying to monitor the start of a peaceful transition.277 
 A day after Saleh refused to sign the GCC transition agreement, Sheikh Sadiq al-
Ahmar, the head of the Hashid tribal federation, one of the most powerful tribes in 
Yemen, declared support for the opposition and his armed supporters started fighting 
Saleh’s security forces in Sana’a, heavy fighting ensued leaving 120 people dead, 	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including civilians.278 As this situation in Sana’a was developing, about 300 Islamic 
militants attacked and captured the city of Zinjibar, a southwestern city on the coast; the 
militants belonged to the group known as Ansar al-Sharia, the umbrella militant 
organization that includes units from several Islamic groups, including AQAP.279 This 
battle, which became known as the Battle of Zinjibar, underscored the concern of al-
Qa’ida militants finding opportunity during the political instability of Yemen’s 
Revolution and taking territory. While the forces loyal to the Hashid tribal federation and 
the government entered into a ceasefire, militants in Zinjibar consolidated their control by 
capturing several armored vehicles, and larger parts of the city.280 
 As the fighting continued in both Zinjibar and Sana’a, more fighters joined the 
opposition. On June 3, 2011 the presidential palace in Sana’a was attacked, and a blast 
tore through the mosque that was used by high-ranking members of the Saleh 
government, including Saleh himself, the blast killed several soldiers but the fate of Saleh 
was not clear.281 The next day, Saleh left for Saudi Arabia to seek medical treatment, and 
power was handed over to Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.282 As the revolution 
in Yemen wore on, there were constant rumors of Saleh returning; however eventually 	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top officials in Saudi Arabia started reporting that the return of President Saleh was not 
going to be a likely scenario.283 As the violence and the transition of power to Hadi 
continued, the spread of AQAP continued into the areas of Yemen in which there was no 
effective military presence.  
 As 2011 wore on the violence in Yemen continued, alongside the violence, the 
protests continued calling on Saleh to give up all power, while there were counter-
protests by supporters of Saleh and his regime. Both sides continued to stand firm on 
their demands that the other give up all desires to hold power in Yemen. This was all 
happening while there were repeated attempts by the GCC, Saudi Arabia leading and the 
United Nations to broker a peaceful transition. On September 23, 2011 Saleh returned to 
Yemen despite the reports that Saudi Arabia would prevent him from leaving their soil, 
the return caught both the support and opposition to Saleh by surprise.284 Before this 
return, both Saudi and American diplomats had urged Saleh to stay in Saudi Arabia, 
fearing that his return would set off further violence.285 Unsurprisingly, the increase in 
violence is what occurred, as soon as Saleh came back to Yemen he was greeted with 
almost a million Yemenis rallying against him in Sana’a.286 Less than a day after the 
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arrival of Saleh in Yemen, government forces attacked an opposition camp, killing at 
least 17 people.287  
As the violence continued, the U.N. Security Council met in October and passed 
Resolution 2014, condemning the violence and calling for Saleh to accept the GCC 
brokered peace plan.288 The violence and Saleh’s intransigence continued into the end of 
October, and on the 30th of October 2011, the General People’s Congress announced that 
it would nominate Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi to stand in the proposed 
presidential elections once the GCC deal was signed.289  
 At this point, it would be wise to take a step back and realize that all of the 
violence and instability that was happening at this time in Yemen was setting the country 
up for a troubled future. Not only was the instability bringing Yemen closer to the edge 
of becoming a failed state, it was also weakening state institutions to the point that they 
were ineffective. This ineffectiveness led to the populace losing faith in the national 
government, allowed for the entrance of rebellions and militant Islamists, and also kept 
the divisions of the past open.  
 As the uprising continued into November, the violence and protests continued. 
The Houthi rebels in northern Yemen took advantage of the instability and scored 
victories against pro-government tribes, seizing control of northern districts and moving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  287	  Solomon,	  Erika.	  "Attack	  on	  Yemen	  Opposition	  Camp	  Kills	  17."	  Reuters.	  Thomson	  Reuters,	  25	  Sept.	  2011.	  Web.	  10	  Sept.	  2015.	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/24/uk-­‐yemen-­‐idUKTRE78L79020110924>.	  288	  Lynch,	  Colum.	  "U.N.	  Council	  Condemns	  Violence	  in	  Yemen,	  Urges	  Saleh	  to	  Cede	  Power."	  The	  
Washington	  Post.	  N.p.,	  21	  Oct.	  2011.	  Web.	  10	  Sept.	  2015.	  <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-­‐security/un-­‐council-­‐condemns-­‐violence-­‐in-­‐yemen-­‐urges-­‐saleh-­‐to-­‐cede-­‐power/2011/10/21/gIQAnQub4L_story.html>.	  289	  "Yemen	  to	  reach	  power-­‐transfer	  deal	  soon:	  FM".	  Xinhua.	  2	  November	  2011.	  Retrieved	  29	  October	  2015.	  
	   84	  
towards Sana’a.290 However, by mid-November, the Gulf nations, especially Saudi 
Arabia has pushed Saleh to sign the agreement brokered by the GCC and on November 
23, Saleh arrived in Saudi Arabia to sign the GCC deal.291 The political instability and 
protests continued into December, as protestors continued to call for Saleh to stand trial. 
Then, on December 12, 2011, fifteen al-Qa’ida militants broke out of a prison in the 
coastal city of Aden.292 This escape brought to the forefront the capability that al-Qa’ida 
possessed in Yemen, and the weakened state institutions that had failed to prohibit the 
escape of dangerous militants. The bigger problem that the escape showed, however, was 
that even after the Arab Spring had hit Yemen, and the government changed, the 
ineffectiveness had continued. This did not and would not bode well for the young 
administration of President Hadi.  
The transition of power in Yemen also pointed to a pernicious problem within 
foreign policymaking, where western nations support leaders without adequate 
consideration of the long-term issues pervasive in nations like Yemen. This backing of 
one leader over another generally ends up presenting problems, in the case of Yemen, 
these problems were more numerous because while the United States was supporting the 
Hadi government, it was also allowing Saleh to come into the United States for medical 
treatment.293 This was justified by officials in the Obama Administration as a necessary 
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step to keep Saleh distanced from the political transition happening in Yemen, even 
though it was known that the Yemeni people would see it as U.S. support for a leader that 
Yemenis rose up against.294 The decision to go ahead with allowing Saleh to enter the 
U.S. was problematic, not only because it tarnished U.S. reputation in Yemen, but also 
because it showed the inability of the United States government to formulate a coherent 
policy towards what was happening in Yemen. This lack of coherence translated into 
regional allies realizing that the U.S. had no viable options for the instability, apart from 
fighting AQAP. The group, although a formidable threat to U.S. national interests, is just 
part of the host of issues that Yemen finds itself in. In fact, it can be argued that the 
overall instability in the country allows for AQAP to expand its control, so any policy or 
set of policies not addressing the deeper issues in Yemen do nothing to address AQAP. 
As 2011 turned into 2012, the militant group showed its resiliency in the face of U.S. 
efforts against it by capturing more territory in southeastern Yemen.295 
 The next month, Yemen held presidential elections, however as the election were 
happening there was violence reported at the polls.296 Another issue that was coming to 
the forefront in Yemen at this time was the growing strength of the Southern Movement, 
a group struggling for the secession of southern Yemen from the government in Sana’a. 
However, even with these issues, elections were held on February 21, 2012 and on the 
27th of the same month, President Hadi was formally inaugurated. Nevertheless, the 	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fissures within the Yemeni polity were not easily to be overcome as the Joint Meeting 
Parties, an alliance comprised of both Islamist and secular opposition parties, quickly 
boycotted the elections.297 
Rise of the Houthis and Saudi Intervention 
 The newly elected Hadi government was by no means on solid footing at the end 
of the elections in February 2012. Yemen as a nation lay in a deplorable state, with a 
failing economy, multiple groups of militants that it could not effectively deal with, and a 
population that was increasingly realizing how ineffective the government was at 
providing for basic needs. All of this combined with the regional turmoil that was 
engulfing the Middle East at this time and taking the attention of not only the regional 
powers, but also the western powers, like the U.S. and E.U. nations.  
 Since 2012 and until the Houthi takeover in 2014, the national government of 
Yemen had survived, however, the internal divisions within Yemen had persisted. The 
Houthis had supported the anti-Saleh protests and as an article in Foreign Policy 
magazine pointed out, the Houthis “played a role in the transitions process that included 
the national dialogue process and redefining the constitutions.”298 However, the final 
constitution was not to the liking of the Houthis, who greatly disagreed with the Hadi 
government’s plan to reconstitute Yemen as a six region federal state.299 With this 
emboldening them, the Houthis took matters into their own hands and started a military 
campaign against the Hadi administration.  	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 Another reason for the Houthi rebellion in 2014 was the economy, in July of that 
year; the national government announced an increase in fuel prices as part of reforms to 
subsidy programs that were being required by the International Monetary Fund as 
conditions for continued financial assistance.300 Yemen has among the highest level of 
energy subsidies in the region, however given its low per capita income; the country 
could not afford to continue to subsidize energy. Another major reason the government 
decided to reform the subsidy program was because of the lopsided benefits that it 
resulted in, with the elite of Yemeni society benefitting the most from the subsidies, by 
smuggling the cheap oil to neighboring nations and accruing large profits.301 However, 
these subsidies also allowed the nation of Yemen to function by keeping the prices of 
transport, food, and water low. As soon as these subsidies were removed, the prices of 
these staple functions spiked, hitting the poor the hardest. The Houthis grabbed on to this 
populist issue and exploited it to the detriment of the Hadi government. 
Officially, the uprising began in August 2014. Over the rest of 2014, the Houthi 
militia made its way towards Sana’a, fighting some tribes, making alliances with others, 
and defeating the national military along the way.302 As the Houthis made advances, the 
national government in Sana’a weakened and on September 21, 2014 as the Houthis 
captured the capital city, Prime Minister Mohammed Salim Basindwah was forced to 
resign.303 Eventually, the Houthi rebellion and its increasing control over government 
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held territory also forced President Hadi to resign.304 As the Houthis pushed southwards, 
they ignited fears of the sectarian divisions flaring back up in Yemen, with accusations 
flying back and forth of the Houthis trying to install a Zaydi Imamate in Sana’a and the 
Houthis alleging that the national government was threatening their Zaydi culture in the 
north.305 Apart from causing political instability, the Houthi rebellion also allowed for 
AQAP to launch reprisal attacks against the Houthis and made it so many Yemenis who 
would not have usually sided with AQAP to side with the group because they are 
opposed to Houthi rule.306 This has caused a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, 
making the group more dangerous while also allowing it to gain followers. Alongside the 
threat of a growing militancy by AQAP, many people have also worried about how the 
chaos in Sana’a has opened the door for the Southern Movement to increase its 
activities.307 
 A major issue with this rebellion is the international involvement in it. Saleh has 
accused the United States of working with the Houthis to undermine the Hadi 
government.308 However, this could not be farther from the truth, as a recent report on the 
current crisis in Yemen from the Congressional Research Service stated, the Obama 
administration’s position on Yemen has been support for the Saudi-led coalition’s 
military action against the Houthis.309 Along with providing materiel support to the 
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coalition, the Obama administration has also staunchly behind the Hadi government.310 In 
the aftermath of the Houthi takeover, several Western and Asian countries closed their 
embassies in Sana’a, and the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution standing against 
the group’s seizure of power. As the Houthis consolidated control in Yemen, the 
sectarian divisions continued to flare and with them the violence continued unabated. As 
this instability continued, AQAP and other like-minded militant groups continued to 
spread. As the civil war between the Hadi government and the Houthi rebels became 
more entrenched, Saudi Arabia alongside multiple Gulf nations decided to intervene in 
the conflict.  
 This Saudi-led intervention began in 2015 to influence the outcome of the civil 
war that was engulfing Yemen. The Saudis, spearheading a coalition of nine Arab states, 
began carrying out airstrikes and imposed an aerial and naval blockade in March of 2015. 
The intervention began as a response to requests for assistance by the Hadi government. 
Eventually the coalition of multiple Arab countries joined the Saudis to start taking part 
in operations. The military campaign by the Arab coalition, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, 
began in March of 2015. The coalition first declared Yemeni airspace to be a restricted 
area. After that declaration, Saudi Arabia began airstrikes, and quickly moved into setting 
up a naval blockade. Other nations in the coalition also assisted in the blockade including 
the United States. Naval ships were also used to evacuate diplomats and other civilians. 
As March turned into April, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian ground forces started 
exchanging artillery fire with Houthi rebels in Yemen. On April 21st, the Saudi Defence 
Ministry declared that it was ending the campaign of airstrikes because it had 
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“successfully eliminated the threat” to its security posed by Houthi ballistic and heavy 
weaponry.311  
At this point the coalition entered into a new operational phase, which saw an 
increase in aid to Yemen in the hopes of rebuilding the nation after the military strikes. 
However, after the announcement of a ceasefire and movements towards rebuilding, 
airstrikes by the coalition resumed as the Saudis attempted to restore the Hadi 
government and push back against Houthi advances.312 As the airstrikes continued the 
toll they took on the ground increased, and various human rights agencies grew 
concerned about the damage that was happening to the infrastructure of the nation as the 
conflict continued.313 Alongside the damage to the national infrastructure, the suffering of 
the civilian population also increased as humanitarian aid became more and more limited.  
 Although the conflict itself has become and continues to be a major issue for the 
Yemeni nation and the overall region, the bigger problem was the involvement of 
multiple nations within the conflict. For the United States, the conflict and its proxy 
nature has resulted in a complex operating environment. The U.S. as has been pointed out 
was already involved in Yemen, through its counter-terrorism operations and economic 
aid delivery, as this conflict started the U.S. voiced support for the Hadi government and 
also supported Saudi Arabia and its coalition in the military campaign against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  311	  Hamid,	  Nadeem	  “Saudi	  Arabia	  Says	  Airstrikes	  in	  Yemen	  Succeeded	  in	  Ending	  Threat”.	  Bloomberg.	  21	  April	  2015.	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­‐04-­‐21/saudi-­‐arabia-­‐says-­‐airstrikes-­‐in-­‐yemen-­‐succeeded-­‐in-­‐ending-­‐threat.	  312	  BBC	  Staff.	  “Yemen	  Conflict:	  Saudis	  launch	  new	  air	  strikes	  on	  rebels”.	  BBC.	  23	  April	  2015.	  Web.	  14	  May	  2015.	  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐32430003.	  313	  Miles,	  Tom.	  “UN	  urges	  Saudi-­‐led	  coalition	  to	  stop	  targeting	  Yemen	  airport”.	  Reuters.	  4	  May	  2015.	  Retrieved	  13	  July	  2015.	  http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0NP1VJ20150504.	  
	   91	  
Houthis, through providing intelligence and logistics.314 This involvement however, has 
made it so that on the ground in Yemen, there are very strong anti-U.S. sentiments, as the 
Houthis see the support the United States has given Saudi Arabia as the U.S. standing 
against Houthi interests. However, the U.S. support of the Houthis is mixed at best. Parts 
of U.S. policy-making circles understand the use of the Houthis and favor them in their 
fight against AQAP and now, ISIL. This support is countered by other policy-makers 
continuing their support of Saudi Arabia in countering the Houthis, whom they see as a 
group of militants backed by Iran. This confusion amongst policy makers in the United 
States is leading to the U.S. having very little say in what is happening on the ground in 
Yemen.  
 Not that the United States should be controlling the future of the Yemeni nation in 
any direct way, but the fact that there are real U.S. interests that need to be protected in 
Yemen is a something that needs to be kept in mind. The stated interests of the U.S. range 
from making sure that militant groups like AQAP and ISIL do not spread to the 
protection of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait in Red Sea, from which a significant 
portion of the world’s oil supply is shipped through. The current policy stature of the 
United States, does not, significantly protect either of these interests, since both of the 
interests are connected to stability on the ground in Yemen. As we will see in the next 
section, the spread on militants in Yemen is completely unchecked because of the 
increasing instability. Not only al-Qa’ida but now, increasingly, ISIL is spreading its 
network in the Yemeni hinterlands. This trend should be deeply concerning to U.S. 
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policymakers, in the rush to support our Saudi allies in their ill-conceived foray into 
Yemen the U.S. may have compromised on some of its key interests in the region.  
Rise of ISIL in Yemen 
 The rise of ISIL in Syria and Iraq in the summer of 2014 was something that 
caused great concern across the world, and as the group has grown in its brutality and 
deadliness, the concern and readiness to counter its threat has grown. However, the group 
itself is not one that is easily contained. Its message is spread far and wide, and alongside 
the message the group’s menace grows. With attacks happening in France, the United 
States, Indonesia, and other nations, ISIL has shown itself to be a formidable force. ISIL 
has also shown itself to be a group that has learned from the mistakes of al-Qa’ida and is 
highly organized. This organizational ability has allowed it to grow branches across the 
Middle East. One of the countries in which ISIL now boasts a branch is Yemen, adding to 
the nation’s history with militancy, ISIL now is openly challenging al-Qa’ida in 
Yemen.315 A recent New York Times article covered the rise of ISIL in Yemen, stating, 
the Saudi-led intervention and the resulting instability “has produced another bitter 
legacy: a new branch of the Islamic State that has quietly grown in strength and appears 
determined to distinguish itself as Yemen’s most disruptive and brutal force.”316  
 The ISIL branch has stoked sectarian divisions in Yemen by attacking Shia 
mosques in Sana’a, which killed 130 people and started the civil war in Yemen in March 
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2015.317 Recently, the group has also carried out powerful car bombings in southern 
Yemen and released videos of executions and sectarian denunciations of Yemen’s Shia 
minority.318 These attacks and the spread of militancy in Yemen is adding greatly to the 
instability within the nation and is threatening the various U.S. interests in the country 
and the region. Analysts state that just like al-Qa’ida, ISIL has profited from the security 
vacuum that was created in Yemen after the Houthi takeover and the Saudi-led 
intervention, this vacuum has allowed ISIL to rally Sunnis in Yemen against the Shia 
Houthis.319 More crucially, however, the militant groups have faced no resistance from 
the Saudi-led coalition and its allies, this lack of resistance has made it so ISIL has been 
able to consolidate its hold in Yemen.320 The group, taking advantage of the instability in 
the country, officially entered the scene in Yemen as Wilayat al-Yemen or “Province of 
Yemen”, ISIL’s existence was made public on November 13, 2014 when ISIL’s leader 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced via an audio message titled “Despite the Disbelievers’ 
Hate” that he had accepted coordinated oaths of allegiance from fighters based in Yemen, 
Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.321  
 ISIL has organized itself in Yemen following the organizational pattern of its 
other branches. The ISIL branch in Yemen, flows out of the Wilayat al-Yemen, which is 
the head office for the nation, underneath the Wilayat, are sub-wilayats, which control 
various provinces and cities in Yemen.322 Although these sub-wilayats are taking orders 
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more flexibility and allow them to conduct operations without having bureaucratic 
hindrances.323 There is also some evidence that the ISIL branch in Yemen has 
coordinated with ISIL branches in other nations, specifically the main branch in Syria.324 
As far as the strategy of ISIL in Yemen is concerned, the group has replicated its strategy 
from other nations of attempting sectarian tensions, which is a strategy that reflects 
ISIL’s overarching global strategy. The targets, tactics and propaganda of each of the 
sub-wilayats reflect the group’s global strategy and its overarching narrative of Sunni-
Shi’a conflict.325 ISIL’s branch in Yemen has focused its propaganda efforts in this 
direction also, recruiting followers in Yemen and abroad, on denouncing the Zaydi 
Houthis and in claiming to be the protector of the country’s Sunnis.326  
This presents a deeply concerning point for U.S. policymakers, given the 
complicated situation that has developed in Syria regarding ISIL. The United States, 
along with a global coalition of European and Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia has 
aligned itself against ISIL, given this; the Houthis in Yemen would presumably be allies 
of the U.S. led coalition. However, this is far from true, although there is support amongst 
Pentagon officials for the Houthis against ISIL, it is not widespread, as most of the 
foreign-policy machinery of the U.S. is still aligned with the Saudis, one of the longest 
standing allies of the U.S. in region. The Saudis and other Gulf nations have no desire to 
see the Houthis emerge triumphant from the chaos in Yemen. Yet, neither the U.S. nor 
the Gulf nations want to see ISIL takeover Yemen in any significant way. 
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 This presents a major problem; the oft-repeated saying of the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend breaks down in this situation, since ISIL is not at all the friend of the 
U.S. Furthermore, the Houthis are also not considered friends of the United States in any 
sense. However, to the most effective force fighting ISIL in Yemen at this point are the 
Houthis. The Houthis have also formed the only able fighting force against the increasing 
influence of AQAP in Yemen. By doing both of these things, the Houthis have 
inadvertently assisted U.S. efforts in Yemen. However, because of the continued 
assistance the U.S. has provided the Saudis in their fight against the Houthis, support for 
the United States is virtually non-existent within the Houthi ranks. This places 
policymakers in the United States in a quandary; no one wants to see Yemen become a 
failed state, ruled by a government that is against U.S. interests. However, even with the 
recent military successes of Yemeni government forces against the Houthis, the situation 
looks bleak for a nation of great strategic interest. What may be needed is a policy 
approach that prioritizes the interests of the United States in Yemen and then implements 
the policies in a way that assists the various actors through the priorities. An example of 
such a method can be understood through the threat of ISIL in Yemen is one of high 
priority and aligning the parties involved in the conflict to join forces against ISIL 
branches in Yemen. This process would require deep level diplomacy with multiple 
parties who would have to be convinced as to the validity of the prioritization policy. 
Given the rising policy-paralysis regarding Yemen, policymakers in the U.S. will have to 
chart a new course regarding the policy in Yemen. This may mean cooling relations with 
some long-standing allies in the Gulf region; however, the temporary cooling of relations 
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will give the U.S. opportunities to work for long-term security in a very destabilized 
region. 
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CHAPTER VII 
TRIBAL POLITICS 
Major Tribes in Yemen 
 Yemen is dominated by several tribal confederations, and each of these 
confederations includes tribes, clans, and extended families.327 The determination of 
which tribe or group is the most powerful is quite difficult because of the constant 
intermarriages and shifting alliances.328 For the most part the tribal confederations are 
located in the north, because before uniting with the North in 1990, South Yemen’s 
socialist leaders had reduced the power and influence of the tribes.329 The most powerful 
tribal confederation in Yemen is the Hashid, the Hashid are the second largest in 
population with hundreds and thousands of followers.330 The leader of the Hashid 
confederation is Sadeq Abdullah al Ahmar and influential members include his brother, 
Hamid al Ahmar, and their other brother, Himyar al Ahmar.331 The confederation is 
concentrated around the northeast governorate of Amran and associated tribes and clans 
include Al Osaimat, Othar, Kharef, Bani Suraim, Hamdan and Sanhan, which is the clan 
of Ali Abdullah Saleh.332 
The second most powerful confederation is the Bakil confederation; they have the 
largest population, and are concentrated north of Sana’a.333 The leaders of the Bakil come 
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from the Abu Lahoum and Nihm tribes; the associated tribes and clans include the 
Khawlan, Arhab, Al Hada, Al Jidaan, Anis, Dihm, Bani Mata, and Haimatyeen.334 The 
third most powerful tribal confederation in Yemen is the Madhaj, this confederation is 
geographically dispersed but concentrated in the central part of the country, and the 
confederation is known for its business and educated elites.335 The clans and tribes 
associated with the Madhaj include: the Murad, Abidah, Ans, Al Zaraniq, Al Awaliq, 
Kaifah, Al Bakzm, Al Sabyha, Al Abadil, Al Alhasani, and Al Fadhli.336 
The prevalence of tribes in Yemen and the political power that they exercise 
should give policymakers looking at the conflict in Yemen a pause. Any policy changes 
or changes in the status quo that the United States or any other outside party is wanting in 
Yemen will have to go through the tribal confederations. Meaning the powerful tribes are 
the ones who will have to be brought into the fold and convinced that the status quo 
needs to be changed. The tribal framework of Yemen makes it that the ‘ground-level’ 
work that needs to be done in the nation will be done with the help of the tribes. 
Policymakers in the United States have already had experience with tribal politics and 
dynamics in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. This is not to say that the same policies can 
be applied in Yemen, however many of lessons learned in both of these nations can and 
should be applied in Yemen. One major aspect of tribal society in Yemen that U.S. 
policymakers should pay clos attention to is the built in conflict resolution processes 
within the tribal communities. These conflict resolution processes have been part of the 
tribal communities in Yemen for generations and have been successfully used to resolve 
conflicts throughout Yemeni history. With the national security issues that the United 	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States faces in the nation, these indigenous conflict resolution strategies could prove to be 
an important resource in moving the troubled Gulf nation towards peace. In the following 
section, we will further explore these conflict resolution methods and the interaction of 
the tribes with governance. Before we take a detailed look into the tribal governance in 
Yemen it would be wise to see a pictorial representation of where many of these tribes 
have influence, the following maps will show this influence: 
Map of Tribes in Yemen (Hashid Confederation in green) 
 
 
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/images/tribes-map1.gif 
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Map of Abyan Tribes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   101	  
 
 
Map of Al Bayda Tribes 
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Tribal Governance 
Yemen is a nation that has tribal society woven into its societal fabric; therefore, 
any political change in the nation must, and usually does involve the major tribes. The 
depth of the tribal structures can be seen within the national character of Yemen, 
especially in the lack of national identity, for example, people in southern Yemen call 
themselves southerners or Shafi’i instead of Yemeni.337 This lack of national identity 
makes it so any sort of nationhood becomes a very complicated issue in Yemen. With the 
tribes being a major historical force in society and societal organization, large swaths of 
Yemen essentially exist as a multitude of ‘nations’, each with its own methods of 
governance and conflict resolution processes. However, before we analyze how the tribes 
interact with politics and their conflict resolution strategies, we should dispel a myth 
about the tribes that hinders policymakers’ ability to engage with the tribes. The myth is 
that tribes and the tribal dominance of society in Yemen is a hindrance to the growth and 
development of the nation. Through this lens the tribes are, unfortunately, viewed as 
obstacles to peace in Yemen. However, in a country in a country like Yemen, where the 
state is weak, the tribal system—especially tribal conflict resolution mechanisms—can 
help promote national reconciliation, stability, and even state building.338  
Tribal interaction with Politics 
 The tribes and the tribal society become part of Yemen’s politics and governance, 
with many tribal leaders ending up in powerful political positions. When tribal leaders 	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move into political positions within the nation, they lay claim to power on behalf of their 
tribe.339 This makes it so the loyalty of the political leaders is linked to the tribes in a very 
key way to the tribes. In the minds of the leaders, their tribes concerns are what are given 
importance. In turn, this makes it so the national polity of Yemen suffers. The issue in 
Yemen regarding tribal leaders getting into politics is akin to early political leaders in the 
U.S. being more loyal to the colonies or states they came from rather than the nation. One 
can imagine problems that would rise in governance if this were the case in the United 
States. The interference of tribal leaders in internal affairs is to the extent that every time 
a person has political power, he is somehow affiliated to a tribe, and naturally, every tribe 
competes for more of a share of the national power structure.340 This competition for 
power creates a constantly fragility in Yemen341, and in turn makes the nation a state in 
which the national government has very little control. 
Tribal Structure 
 However, as indicated above, Yemenis have relied on indigenous tribal traditions 
to regulate conflict and establish justice for centuries, if not millennia.342 Tribal law has 
effectively handled conflicts between various tribes, between tribes and extractive 
companies, and between tribes and the government.343 It has successfully prevented and 
resolved conflicts over resources, development services, and land, and has sometimes 
managed to contain complex revenge-killing cases. Nationally, tribal mediators have 
played an important role in promoting political dialogue and building consensus among 	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political groups.344 The tribes in Yemen have gotten to this point of pre-eminence 
because of the corruption and the weaknesses of the state institutions there.345 These 
tribes provide social order outside the formal system of governance.346 Tribes and tribal 
law act, in the words of political scientist Daniel Corstange, as “second-best substitutes 
for an absent or weak state.”347 People approve of the tribes because they provide basic 
rule of law in the form of conflict resolution and regulation.348 The key to the system of 
tribal social structure in Yemen is based on the collective responsibility and 
accountability of the tribal leaders (sheikhs) to their respective communities.349 The 
leadership dynamic within the tribes is not one of a sheikh being the ‘chief’ who has 
authority over his ‘followers’, instead the legitimacy that a sheikh has is gathered through 
the acknowledgment of tribesmen, which is given if the individual has consistently 
shown the ability to resolve tribal problems, resolve conflicts, and safeguard the tribe’s 
interests without resorting to coercion.350 Another point to be raised is that the title of 
sheikh does not pass automatically from father to son; it is a title that must be earned 
though earning the respect of tribesmen.351  
 Furthermore, the tribal structure is not hierarchical, as was pointed out above, 
there is no paramount sheikh sitting atop the tribe. Rather, there are ‘prominent’ sheikhs 
who earn their status by attending to tribal needs and interests, and also providing conflict 
resolution services within the tribe and amongst tribes.352 These ‘layers of authority’ are 	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relevant within the conflict resolution system when the parties are exercising their right to 
appeal when they disagree with the verdict of an arbitrator.353 When a conflict does arise, 
a sheikh or some respected social figure first mediates between parties and helps them 
choose an arbitrator, then after the arbitrator has heard the case, the parties may appeal 
twice at higher tribal arbitration levels before the decision becomes binding.354 The tribe 
in Yemen, thus, is a social organization that gains its legitimacy from a set of traditional 
riles the constitutes a social contract among the tribe’s members as well as between them 
as their sheikhs and other tribes.355  
This social contract, or Customary Law, governs public affairs within the tribes, 
protects common interests, and extends protection and economic support to tribal 
members.356 This Customary Law system that the tribes in Yemen follow is one that is 
resilient and has continued to evolve as the country has evolved.357 This system is mostly 
dominant in the tribal areas; however even Yemenis in the urban areas often prefer it to 
the formal court system.358 The tribal law system is more accessible, effective, and much 
faster than the formal legal system in the country, furthermore the formal court systems 
are mistrusted since they are often linked with corrupt government officials.359 Even the 
national government, has at times, called upon the tribes to solve complex conflicts, 
especially between the government and tribes.360 However, one issue that the tribes are 
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feeling is the increased pressure being placed on these Customary Law systems with the 
increasing levels of violence, and institutional failure of the courts.361 
 This is a troubling sign for the future of the nation of Yemen; the national, formal 
systems of conflict resolution through the courts have stopped functioning because of the 
violence. If the more informal systems within the tribal communities also get hampered 
and cease to function, if this happens a key part of Yemeni society will have been altered, 
this alteration could have large detrimental effects on the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy 
goals in the region. What needs to happen is for U.S. policymakers to tap into the tribal 
conflict resolution networks to assist in moving the nation towards resolving some of the 
major issues facing it. This would not mean interrupting the systems already in place but 
allowing U.S. foreign policy goals to work with those systems.  
Tribal Conflict Resolution  
 A key aspect of connecting with the indigenous methodologies of conflict 
resolution that the tribes practice is to first understand what the process is. Unlike the 
formal court system, the tribal system is based on consensus building and maintaining 
relationships.362 The keys to tribal traditions are transparency, accountability, solidarity, 
collective responsibility, the protection of public interests and the weak, prioritizing 
community interests over those of the individual, empathy, and forgiveness.363 The 
culture of dialogue and apology are embedded in the practice and rituals of tribal 
Customary Law. 364 The processes of tribal conflict management also emphasize 
tolerance and forgiveness throughout, while also involving a great deal of deliberate 
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negotiation and dialogue to ensure that the conflicting parties are content with the 
resolution.365 Within the conflict management process, the confession or apology play an 
important role in easing the tension and releasing negative emotions, this allows for a 
way of constructive conflict resolution to be opened.366 
 The process itself generally opens with a tribesman or a representing sheikh 
giving banadeq assawah, or “guns of reason” to the person that was wronged, this 
ceremonious offering signals to the party that was wronged that the other side is open for 
arbitration and/or negotiation.367 According to tribal traditions, this ritual signifies a 
confession of the mistake/crime, and in return, the other side shows its honorable tribal 
generosity by accepting mediation and sometimes granting forgiveness or a reduction of 
demanded amends.368 This conflict management system generally deals with conflicts at 
an early stage, when they are not violent, but it also has mechanisms in place to resolve 
conflicts when they become violent.369 When the tribes sense a conflict brewing between 
families or individuals, sheikhs from the two tribes rush in to contain it before it 
escalates, they bring parties to the conflict together to negotiate and settle differences.370 
The negotiation itself is usually facilitated by sheikhs or social figures that each 
party authorizes to his representative, if this process does not work, then a sheikh from a 
third tribe can initiate a mediation process, through which, if a conflict becomes violent, 
he gets the parties to agree to short cease-fire.371 He helps prepare for arbitration by 
getting each party to choose an arbitrator or arbitrators, once that happens, the mediator’s 	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role ends unless a party or parties choose him to arbitrate.372 The arbitrator or arbitrators 
issue a verdict after a long process that involves examining evidence, dialogue, and 
caucuses with the parties to the conflict, at the end of the process each party has the right 
to appeal twice in front of other tribal sheikhs before the verdict becomes final and 
binding.373  
 The tribal conflict management system has a strong enforcement mechanism 
mainly based on collective responsibility and action.374 In each phase of the process, the 
parties bring guarantees to the mediators and arbitrators; these guarantees can take the 
form of daggers, guns, or money that is presented as a symbol of the parties’ commitment 
to implement the arbitrator’s verdict.375 Additionally, the parties are required to obtain the 
support of respected tribal sheikhs who serve as guarantors; therefore any offense 
committed by any of the parties is an insult to their guarantors.376 Through this two 
pronged accountability approach, the parties are held accountable not only through the 
monetary resources they expend on the process, but also through the leadership of their 
respected tribes. This also gives us a look into the core strength of the tribal system in 
Yemen, these individuals who go to their respective sheikhs to get these guarantees have 
a very strong incentive to work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and also 
make sure that they do not break any of rules set forth by the mediators. If they run into 
trouble, or break any of the rules the individuals risk angering their sheikhs and becoming 
an outcast in a society that is held together by these tribes. The shame that the individual 
would bring not only to themselves, but their families and relatives if they were to be 	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kicked out of the tribal network is so high that they will work very hard to continue the 
conflict resolution process.  
 Therefore, what exists in Yemen is an indigenous system that has existed for a 
long time and has become stronger as time has gone on. A key part of any policy that is 
pursued by the United States in Yemen must include the indigenous conflict resolution 
processes that have developed within the tribal structures. There are multiple benefits to 
approaching the stabilization of conflicts in Yemen through this strategy. The first, and 
the main, benefit is that whatever conflict resolution processes are created through this 
process will be inherently indigenous, and therefore will have a higher ‘buy in’ than a 
process that is imposed externally. The recent history of U.S. involvement in the Middle 
East is rife with failed strategies of imposing governance models that ended up failing 
and resulting in the political situations deteriorating. The legacy of western involvement 
in Yemen is already littered with failed policies; this time around the United States 
cannot afford to have history repeat itself.  
 However, the engagement with the tribal structure and the traditional system in 
Yemen is fraught with risks. Part of the ‘smart strategy’ U.S. and other western 
policymakers will have to adopt will be the understanding of these risks. A major risk is 
borne simply out of the fact that there is a lack of understanding of local power dynamics 
and the political landscape, which could result in the worsening of already existing 
conflicts or the creation of new ones.377 If the engagement process is not done carefully, 
the tribal leaders that are engaged might end up losing the political authority and the trust 
that they have built up in their communities, and therefore, the local people would end up 
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losing the access to justice that they have enjoyed through the tribal system.378 This risk 
could potentially be alleviated through the integration of the informal tribal system into 
the formal system that exists in Yemen.379 Another method of avoiding this risk would be 
through the adoption of methods that allow the informal system to function smoothly, yet 
deal with some of the major political and social issues the nation is currently dealing 
with. Either way, the process of engagement and integration will have to be shaped 
through an in-depth assessment of local needs, the opportunities the process might offer, 
and the risks that it entails and ways to mitigate them.380  
 One of the first steps that can be taken in the formulation of such a strategy of 
engagement is to attempt to understand the local needs, opportunities, and risks. A 
method of getting to this understanding is through analyzing the situation in Yemen 
through a systems theory approach. This is what the remainder of this thesis will attempt. 
The hope is that by the end of this final portion, the reader will understand the ‘system’ 
that the policies formulated on Yemen will operate in. This understanding should yield in 
better policy formulation and execution, and through this an overall better level of 
engagement with the nation of Yemen.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 SYSTEMS THEORY AND YEMEN 
Systems Theory 
 The systems theory approach to peacebuilding has had a long and rich 
developmental history; it is not necessary here to analyze the historical development of 
this approach. What this section will aim to do is to explore the core concepts of the 
approach and help the reader understand what these core concepts are. The overall goal 
of this chapter is to finally attempt to apply those concepts to the crisis in Yemen. The 
hope here is to show the reader a potential path to constructive conflict resolution in the 
country as well as show the policymaker a method of U.S. involvement that may result in 
long-term development for Yemen.  
 One of the major thinkers of the systems theory approach to peacebuilding is the 
scholar Robert Ricigliano, in his book Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable 
Peacebuilding; he outlines some of the core basic tools of systems thinking. They are: 
Interaction or relationships among parts; Interconnectedness of parts; Feedback and 
dynamic (as opposed to linear) causality; and Patterns or holism.381 One of the first steps 
in moving from seeing individual parts to seeing whole systems is to focus on the 
interactions among the parts.382 This may seem as an obvious point, however, this is a 
fundamental and very common mistake that is made in the realm of peacebuilding or 
conflict resolution. A lot of time and many resources are spent on working to figure out 
how to fix the various parts rather than seeing the whole system, or even how the parts 	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interact. There is a major issue that occurs if this is being done in a complex environment 
like the one that is faced in Yemen. A good example is that of fixing a car, one can see 
the car as a collection of separate parts, and it would be accurate to see a car as such. 
However, all of those separate parts interact in specific ways to make the car run 
smoothly. If one or multiple parts break, then it is appropriate to go in and attempt to fix 
those parts, but the interactions to other parts must be kept in mind, otherwise we would 
have an endless problem on our hands.  
 After one can see the interactions that the parts of a system have to each other, 
then we can move to understanding the interconnectedness, how each piece of a system is 
connected, directly or indirectly, to other parts in the system.383 This interconnectedness 
is like a spider-web: Pulling on any one strand in the web will affect, directly or 
indirectly, every other strand in the web.384 If we look at the example of Yemen, the 
various parties involved in the conflict are the pieces of the system, forming a ‘spider-
web’ of connections that are dependent on each other. In the last chapter, there was an 
exploration of the tribal structure in Yemen, all of the various tribes are pieces of the 
‘system’ that is Yemen. The political parties, the people, the various civil society 
organizations, the various foreign interests, and unfortunately the militant groups that 
have found a home in the hinterlands of the nation join these tribes to complete this 
system. All of the various parts are fluid, and constantly interacting with each other. 
Sometimes these interactions are positive and sometimes they are negative.  
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 This interconnectedness gives rise to the ideas of feedback and dynamic 
causality.385 The feedback can be thought in terms of the spider-web mentioned above, if 
one strand of the web is plucked, the vibration travels around the spider-web, the system, 
until it comes back to affect the strand that was initially plucked.386 It is the same for 
systems, if one part of the system affects another part that original action will reverberate 
throughout the system and eventually act on the part that initiated the action.387 This 
interconnectedness leads to dynamic causality, which is a defining feature of 
wholeness.388 Within an interconnected system, it is this dynamic causality that is at 
work, instead of linear causality. Linear causality is a fairly simple concept to grasp, it 
looks at discrete causal chains and assumes that causality happens in a line that travels in 
one direction: If you do A, then B will happen; if B happens, then C will result.389 This is 
different from the dynamic causality that exists in complex systems like the one seen in 
nations like Yemen. Dynamic causality assumes that no initial condition exists in 
isolation; instead all conditions are part of an interconnected system.390  
For example, if a military strike occurs on an al-Qa’ida camp in Yemen, it can be 
seen as an isolated incident, and many times it is seen in that manner. But in reality, on 
the ground, it is far from an isolated incident; the effects of the strike reverberate 
throughout the system on multiple levels. Initially, the effects are very localized, only 
stretching to the community and the tribe level. However, the effects slowly spread 
beyond the local levels and start affecting the national levels, questions as to who was 
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involved may be raised, where intelligence for the strike came from? Who was providing 
the intelligence? Followed by questions of loyalty in a constantly shifting battle-space 
and a very fluid political system. On the international level, questions of the legitimacy of 
the strike may be raised, also questions about the efficacy of the strategy. All of these 
questions result in complexities for policy-makers, complexities that exist and need to be 
dealt with.  
 This example of a strike is a simple one, however, there have been major system 
changing incidents that have occurred in Yemen’s recent history, the coup and the 
revolution are just two of the examples. These incidents have not just affected the 
complex system that exists in Yemen but have altered it in ways that were unimaginable 
to policy-makers just a few years ago. The effects of these changes are too many in 
number and too complex for this work to analyze, but the fact remains that they are 
changes that will have deep, and long-term effects to the system and policy-makers will 
have to be cognizant of these effects as the U.S. and other western nations get further 
involved in the situation.  
 One potential methodology that can be used to analyze, understand, and 
potentially move towards a more long-term peacebuilding process in Yemen is the SAT 
model, as outlined by Ricigliano in his work. The ‘SAT’ in this model stands for 
‘Structural’; ‘Attitudinal’; and ‘Transactional’, together these three components form a 
framework for systemic change in the peacebuilding context.391 The Structural 
component refers to the “systems and institutions designed to meet people’s basic needs”, 
the peacebuilding tools in this component include governance assistance, economic 
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reconstruction programs, rule-of-law program, security sector reform, etc.392 The 
Structural component is working at the government level and working on the processes 
and issues that are dealt in the public sector level. The peacebuilding tools show that most 
of the work in this component in the framework is involved in improving governance 
mechanisms, meaning the tools operate at the upper-levels of society and work with a 
‘top-down’ philosophy. As important as this component of the framework is, it is not one 
that can be relied on exclusively, especially in a complex environment like Yemen, 
unfortunately, up until now, the intervention of the United States has been almost 
exclusively at this level.  
 The second component of the SAT model is Attitudinal, this component refers to 
the shared norms, beliefs, social capital, and intergroup relationships that affect the level 
of cooperation between or people.393 The peacebuilding tools within this component 
include, truth and reconciliation commissions, trauma-healing initiatives, community 
dialogue programs, multi-ethnic media programs, etc.394 This is a component of the SAT 
model that may result in some constructive progress being made in the conflict in Yemen, 
however before I outline how that may be achieved it would help to go through the final 
component of the SAT model, and that is Transactional. This component refers to 
processes and skills used by key people to peacefully manage conflict, build interpersonal 
relationships, solve problems collaboratively, and turn ideas into action.395 The tools 
within this component include formal mediation initiatives, cease-fires, negotiation 
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training for representatives of combatants, local development councils, back-channel 
dialogues among leaders, confidence-building measures, and so forth.396  
 Both the Attitudinal and the Transactional components of the SAT model are ones 
that can yield some success in the conflict that has engulfed Yemen. The idea here is that 
policymakers should analyze and approach the conflict in Yemen as one that requires a 
deeper level of commitment than has been seen so far. The advantage of the SAT model 
and its implementation in a complex conflict like Yemen is that it allows for a both the 
Attitudinal and Transactional pieces of the SAT model offer an opportunity to do this. 
Combining the indigenous conflict resolution processes that were discussed in the 
previous section with the tools that are available through the Attitudinal and 
Transactional components is something that is key to allow for the ‘buy in’ necessary for 
any of these processes to work in a nation like Yemen. The full implementation of the 
SAT model also allows the policymakers to go beyond the processes that have been 
implemented so far, and we can clearly see that there is a need to take this step. The 
intervention of the U.S. has so far, as we have seen, has been an approach that has put the 
military aspect of the conflict first.  
The plain reality is that the United States and other nations involved in the 
conflict in Yemen have military and national security interests that override the 
developmental aspects in this situation. The long-term development of the country is not 
the focus of the policymakers, however, given what has been discussed in this work, the 
conflict in Yemen has now become so intertwined with the development of the nation 
that it is something that has to be paid attention to. In fact, it would be of great benefit to 
the overall U.S. policy in the Middle East if the conflict in Yemen comes to a resolution 	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that promises long-term peace in that region of the world. With other Gulf nations 
already staunch U.S. allies in the Middle East, adding another friend in an increasingly 
unstable neighborhood would clearly be something that would assist U.S. interests in the 
region.  
 The SAT model would allow for this to occur, by implementing all three 
components of the model would allow the U.S. to intervene constructively in a nation that 
the U.S. is already involved in. This intervention can take the form of increased aid to 
programs that can tie into indigenous conflict resolution practices. The aid would have to 
be complimented by continued military support to effectively counter the militant threat. 
Added to this prong of intervention should be programs that work to counter extremist 
ideology. The militant groups operating in Yemen have fed off the local tribes and as was 
pointed out in an earlier section the militants have integrated themselves within the tribal 
structures. The SAT model’s implementation would target the connections the militants 
have made in the communities by supporting the traditional peaceful conflict resolution 
methods. The Structural and Attitudinal components of the model would also help in the 
counter-terrorism efforts by allowing for the governance challenges that fuel militancy to 
be addressed while also addressing the attitude shifts that need to occur for militancy to 
be dealt with, through its focus on healing the communities that have been affected by the 
violence of militant groups.  
This is where both the Attitudinal and Transactional components of the SAT 
model can be addressed. The counter-ideology component is of high importance to any 
successful counter-terrorism strategy, and the work will have to be done at the local level. 
The work that is needed in Yemen to counter the militant ideology will have to involve 
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work at the community level, meaning investment will have to be made in aspects of both 
the Attitudinal and Transactional components of the SAT model. For the Structural 
component, the rule of law (ROL) and governance programs that have been applied in 
other post-conflict regions will have to be applied. However, in applying these programs 
the role of the tribes will have to be kept in mind. As indicated above, the tribal system 
already has an indigenous conflict resolution system in place, and without a functioning 
judicial system, the preference for most Yemenis is the tribal system that has successfully 
worked for so long. The application of the Structural component of the SAT model 
through ROL promotion in this system cannot mean pulling people away from the tribal 
systems they are accustomed to.  
  As Yemen enters into a period of recognizing that peace is necessary and the 
conflict must end, the time is ripe for a nation like the U.S. to implement a long-term 
development strategy. The SAT model’s implementation would require work on multiple 
levels with multiple U.S. government agencies operating simultaneously. A major benefit 
of applying a comprehensive system wide model like the SAT model would be its ability 
to take away from the control of groups like AQAP and ISIL. As was pointed out above, 
these groups have successfully applied the theory of competitive control to the point that 
they dominate the population in parts of Yemen. They are the groups that have been able 
to “establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control”397 and 
this dominance has occurred within the larger system of Yemen.  
Since both these groups exercise this dominance, and are effectively the 
governance in the parts of Yemen they control, it means that they have found ways to 	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dominate the structural, attitudinal, and transactional portions of the system they occupy. 
The best way to counter such dominance is to apply the SAT model in a way that targets 
the segments of society that these groups have infiltrated. This approach inherently calls 
for moving beyond the application of a ‘military first’ approach to the crisis in Yemen, 
although the military aspect is important to wrest physical control of territory initially 
from groups like ISIL and AQAP, the keeping of the territory depends on the successful 
application of the SAT model. The application of the SAT model is what is needed to 
effectively address the “winning of hearts and minds” in territory that has been 
dominated by AQAP or ISIL. Therefore, by successfully applying the SAT model to 
recover the areas where AQAP or ISIL exercise competitive control in Yemen, we can 
look forward to dealing with a major issue that has dogged counter-insurgency operations 
in the past.  
One of the main points that have to be kept in mind is that whatever the solutions 
are to the conflict, they have to be owned by the Yemeni people. However, even through 
the analysis that has been done above, one can see how aspects of the SAT model can be 
applied in the Yemeni situation. The clear aspects include trauma-healing programs, 
mediation services that work with and incorporate the indigenous conflict resolution 
processes that the tribes have been performing. The intervention would require assistance 
and support provided to these conflict resolution processes, this support could take the 
form of monetary support and/or logistical support. Alongside this there would need to be 
continued assistance on the governance end, the Structural component of the SAT model. 
Through the successful implementation of the SAT model, there could also be some 
ground made on the counter-terrorism front in Yemen.  
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 Attempting to implement the SAT model in Yemen, of course has major 
implications, not only for the nation of Yemen, but also for the nations like the United 
States, which will be involved in the effort. Regarding the U.S. this policy of 
implementation will deepen the involvement of Washington policymakers in the region. 
Given the fact that the Middle East is a region that the United States is increasingly 
viewing as a place of limited involvement, the political will required for long-term 
involvement in Yemen will be quite high. However, given the security interests present in 
the region, long-term involvement will be something that pays dividends into the future 
for the United States. A high level of involvement does not however mean imposing 
policy onto Yemen. Among the many lessons learned from the U.S. led invasion of Iraq 
and its aftermath is that democracy cannot be simply be ‘planted’ in nations. The process 
of stabilization post-conflict requires patience and allowance of organic, indigenous 
processes to happen. If these processes are short-circuited, it is highly likely that a high 
amount of alienation will occur and the government that the Yemeni state has will not be 
friendly towards U.S. interests in the region.  
Conclusion 
 Taken together, the SAT model gives policymakers who are working on the 
issues in Yemen a powerful tool to deal with not only the issues that Yemen faces right 
now because of the conflict, but also pave a path for long-term development and growth. 
The key concept to understand here is that the idea of long term growth and development 
for a nation like Yemen is predicated on the complete ending of the political violence that 
has existed for so long. Until this violence and instability is not dealt with the growth 
cannot occur. Unfortunately the longer the problems continue, the more difficult finding 
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solutions will become. Yemen already has become a tragedy, seemingly trapped in an 
endless cycle of violence and depravation of human rights and needs. All of these 
problems are not only complicating the present, but are also making the future bleaker. 
This should not be seen as a simple humanitarian cry motivated by a need to assist 
humanity in their time of need, it is that, but for U.S. policymakers it is much more. A 
strategically important nation like Yemen cannot be left alone, and it cannot be left to the 
geopolitical storms of the future. The United States needs to work harder and better to 
ensure that Yemen develops in a peaceful manner, and that Yemenis see the U.S. as a 
partner in peace and not in war.  
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